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Seeing	  a	  jar	  of	  mustard	  in	  the	  refrigerator	  can	  give	  you	  rational	  support	  for	  believing	  
that	  the	  fridge	  contains	  mustard.	  Or	  so	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  suppose.	  When	  you	  see	  a	  jar	  of	  
mustard,	  you	  have	  a	  perceptual	  experience,	  or	  experience	  for	  short,	  and	  we’ll	  say	  that	  when	  
experiences	  provide	  rational	  support	  for	  beliefs,	  they	  justify	  them.1	  Some	  philosophers	  have	  
denied	  that	  experiences	  can	  justify	  beliefs.	  Donald	  Davidson	  (1986)	  held	  that	  the	  transition	  
from	  experience	  to	  belief	  is	  merely	  causal,	  rather	  than	  rational,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  
experiences	  are	  not	  beliefs,	  and	  that	  only	  beliefs	  can	  justify	  other	  beliefs.	  Some	  skeptics	  hold	  
that	  no	  external-­‐world	  beliefs	  are	  justified,	  a	  fortiori	  that	  none	  are	  justified	  by	  experience.	  
Other	  philosophers	  assume	  that	  experiences	  justify	  only	  introspective	  beliefs,	  and	  that	  
perceptual	  justification,	  and	  more	  generally	  empirical	  knowledge,	  has	  to	  be	  reconstructed	  as	  an	  
inference	  from	  an	  introspective	  belief	  to	  an	  external-­‐world	  belief.	  Often	  the	  transition	  from	  
experience	  to	  introspective	  belief	  was	  taken	  as	  unproblematic,	  and	  subsequent	  debate	  
                                                
1	  We	  focus	  on	  the	  visual	  case,	  leaving	  it	  to	  the	  reader	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  discussion	  





concerned	  how	  the	  transition	  from	  introspective	  beliefs	  to	  external-­‐world	  beliefs	  could	  be	  
rational.2	  	  	  	  
In	  this	  entry,	  we	  assume	  without	  argument	  these	  positions	  are	  mistaken.	  We	  begin	  from	  
the	  assumption	  that	  experiences	  (such	  as	  the	  one	  you	  have	  when	  you	  see	  the	  mustard)	  can	  
justify	  external	  world	  beliefs	  about	  the	  things	  you	  see,	  such	  as	  beliefs	  that	  the	  mustard	  jar	  is	  in	  
the	  fridge,	  and	  that	  the	  justification	  experience	  provides	  does	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  justification	  
for	  introspective	  beliefs.	  From	  now	  on,	  we	  often	  let	  it	  remain	  implicit	  that	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  
external	  world	  beliefs,	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  beliefs	  that	  experiences	  justify.3	  Our	  
main	  question	  is	  this:	  what	  features	  of	  experiences	  explain	  how	  they	  justify	  external	  world	  
beliefs?	  The	  grammar	  of	  the	  question	  might	  suggest	  that	  experiences	  suffice	  all	  by	  themselves	  
to	  provide	  justification	  for	  external	  world	  beliefs.	  But	  don’t	  read	  this	  into	  the	  grammar	  of	  the	  
phrase	  “experiences	  justify	  beliefs”.	  	  We	  can	  distinguish	  between	  the	  claim	  that	  an	  experience	  
can	  justify	  a	  belief	  that	  P,	  and	  the	  claim	  that	  an	  experience	  can	  justify	  a	  belief	  that	  P	  without	  
help	  from	  other	  features	  it	  only	  contingently	  has.	  We	  clarify	  our	  question	  further	  in	  Part	  I,	  
where	  we	  explain	  why	  we	  have	  chosen	  this	  point	  of	  departure,	  and	  highlight	  a	  range	  of	  theses	  
about	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  providing	  different	  types	  of	  justification.	  In	  Parts	  II	  and	  III,	  we	  
consider	  the	  role	  of	  features	  of	  experience	  falling	  into	  two	  broad	  categories:	  constitutive	  
features	  of	  experience,	  including	  its	  phenomenal	  character,	  its	  contents,	  its	  status	  as	  attentive	  
or	  inattentive	  (sections	  3-­‐7);	  and	  causal	  features	  of	  experience	  such	  as	  its	  reliability,	  and	  the	  
impact	  of	  other	  mental	  states	  on	  its	  formation	  (sections	  8-­‐10).	  Along	  the	  way,	  we	  discuss	  the	  
relationships	  between	  visual	  experience	  and	  seeing	  (sections	  1	  and	  8),	  and	  we	  contrast	  
perceptual	  justification	  and	  perceptual	  knowledge	  (section	  9).	  
	  
	  
Part	  I.	  Our	  point	  of	  departure	  	  
For	  many	  philosophers,	  the	  topic	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  takes	  its	  shape	  from	  the	  
idea	  that	  experience	  differs	  fundamentally	  from	  belief.	  For	  instance,	  in	  his	  classic	  discussion	  of	  
perceptual	  justification,	  Sellars	  (1956)	  considers	  whether	  experiences	  could	  be	  foundations	  of	  
knowledge,	  if	  they	  were	  acts	  of	  sensing	  particular	  mental	  objects,	  and	  not	  states	  with	  contents	  
that	  can	  be	  correct	  or	  incorrect	  depending	  on	  what’s	  in	  the	  space	  around	  the	  subject.	  If	  
experiences	  do	  not	  represent	  or	  refer	  to	  how	  things	  are	  in	  the	  external	  world,	  part	  of	  the	  
problem	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  will	  be	  to	  explain	  how	  to	  rationally	  bridge	  the	  divide	  
between	  states	  that	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  external	  world,	  and	  states	  that	  do.	  In	  contrast,	  if	  
experiences	  already	  represent	  or	  refer	  to	  things	  in	  the	  external	  world,	  then	  a	  theory	  of	  how	  the	  
transition	  from	  experience	  to	  belief	  can	  be	  rational	  need	  not	  also	  explain	  how	  to	  bridge	  that	  
                                                
2	  The	  two-­‐step	  structure	  is	  the	  hallmark	  of	  indirect	  realist	  theories	  of	  empirical	  knowledge.	  
Different	  versions	  of	  this	  structure	  are	  found	  in	  Chisholm	  (1966),	  Russell	  (1912)	  and	  Ayer	  
(1973).	  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  indirect	  realism	  and	  early	  modern	  theories	  of	  perception	  
and	  its	  epistemic	  role,	  see	  entries	  in	  this	  volume	  by	  Caston,	  Perler	  and	  Simmons.	  
3	  The	  distinction	  between	  external	  world	  beliefs	  and	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  mental	  states	  can	  seem	  
oversimplified	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  perspectival	  characteristics	  of	  visual	  experience.	  For	  





divide.	  	  The	  philosophical	  problems	  that	  give	  shape	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  look	  
very	  different,	  depending	  on	  where	  one	  stands	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  experiences	  
represent	  or	  refer	  to	  how	  things	  are	  in	  the	  external	  world.4	  	  
Rather	  than	  departing	  from	  Sellars’s	  traditional	  starting	  point,	  we	  begin	  from	  three	  
substantial	  assumptions	  about	  visual	  experiences	  that	  are	  entrenched	  in	  many	  contemporary	  
discussions	  bearing	  on	  perceptual	  justification.	  First,	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  transition	  from	  
experiences	  to	  (external	  world)	  beliefs	  can	  indeed	  be	  rational,	  and	  that	  its	  rationality	  does	  not	  
systematically	  rely	  on	  justification	  for	  introspective	  beliefs.	  Second,	  we	  assume	  that	  visual	  
experiences	  are	  distinct	  from	  beliefs,	  so	  that	  perceivers	  need	  not	  believe	  that	  things	  are	  as	  
experiences	  present	  them,	  even	  though	  often	  they	  do	  believe	  this.5	  Third,	  experiences	  have	  
contents	  that	  determine	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  propositions	  that	  are	  good	  candidates	  for	  being	  
justified	  by	  the	  experience.	  Because	  our	  three	  starting	  assumptions	  have	  become	  widespread,	  
we	  want	  to	  outline	  the	  epistemological	  problems	  they	  shape	  and	  the	  options	  they	  open	  for	  
solving	  them.	  Readers	  who	  reject	  any	  of	  the	  assumptions	  may	  nonetheless	  want	  to	  see	  what	  
the	  problems	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  look	  like	  once	  the	  assumptions	  are	  made.	  
	  
	  
1.	  Experiences	  	  
	   Our	  central	  question	  asks	  about	  the	  rational	  role	  of	  conscious	  visual	  experiences	  in	  
justifying	  beliefs	  about	  what	  you	  see.6	  So	  far,	  we’ve	  referred	  to	  a	  conscious	  state	  or	  episode	  of	  
seeing	  as	  an	  experience.7	  Since	  both	  ‘experience’	  and	  ‘seeing’	  have	  multiple	  uses	  in	  ordinary	  
language	  and	  philosophy,	  we	  pause	  to	  explain	  how	  we	  use	  these	  terms.	  
	   In	  our	  usage,	  an	  experience	  is	  a	  phenomenal	  state,	  individuated	  by	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  in	  
that	  state	  (or	  equivalently,	  by	  its	  phenomenal	  character).	  Some	  phenomenal	  states	  are	  distinct	  
from	  any	  states	  of	  seeing,	  which	  are	  in	  turn	  individuated	  by	  relations	  to	  one’s	  surroundings.	  If	  
you	  were	  hallucinating	  when	  you	  opened	  the	  fridge,	  for	  example,	  you	  would	  be	  having	  a	  visual	  
experience,	  but	  wouldn’t	  be	  seeing	  anything.	  
	   It	  is	  controversial	  how	  phenomenal	  states	  are	  related	  to	  states	  of	  seeing.	  It	  is	  thus	  also	  
controversial	  whether	  any	  experiences	  in	  our	  sense	  are	  identical	  with	  any	  states	  of	  seeing.8	  
                                                
4	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  responses	  to	  this	  problem	  that	  reject	  the	  assumption,	  see	  BonJour	  2009.	  
5	  For	  a	  contemporary	  defense	  of	  the	  thesis	  that	  experiences	  are	  a	  form	  of	  belief,	  see	  Glüer	  
2009,	  who	  argues	  that	  experiences	  are	  beliefs	  about	  the	  ways	  things	  look,	  and	  Byrne	  2009.	  For	  
background	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  experiences	  are	  a	  form	  of	  belief,	  see	  section	  2.2	  of	  
Siegel	  2011a.	  
6	  Any	  rational	  role	  for	  unconscious	  perception	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  discussion,	  although	  
we	  will	  touch	  on	  related	  issues	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  sections	  3	  and	  5.	  
7	  Since	  the	  differences	  between	  states	  and	  episodes	  are	  largely	  irrelevant	  to	  our	  discussion,	  we	  
ignore	  them.	  
8	  Some	  disjunctivists	  about	  phenomenal	  character	  identify	  some	  phenomenal	  states	  with	  
certain	  states	  of	  seeing,	  such	  as	  the	  state	  of	  seeing	  the	  mustard	  when	  it	  looks	  yellow.	  For	  





When	  we	  ask	  about	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  experiences,	  we	  are	  asking	  about	  the	  role	  of	  
phenomenal	  states,	  whatever	  their	  relation	  to	  states	  of	  seeing	  turns	  out	  to	  be.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  
fixing	  ideas,	  however,	  it	  is	  easiest	  to	  use	  phrases	  such	  as	  ‘mustard-­‐experience’	  and	  ‘hand-­‐
experience’	  to	  denote	  experiences,	  whether	  they	  are	  hallucinations	  or	  not,	  in	  which	  you	  seem	  
to	  see	  mustard	  (or	  hands)	  and	  it	  looks	  to	  you	  as	  if	  there	  is	  some	  mustard	  (or	  there	  are	  some	  




2.	  	  Justification	  
Justification	  is	  a	  normative	  notion,	  tied	  to	  what	  is	  rational	  for	  a	  subject	  to	  believe.10	  
Within	  the	  basic	  normative	  notion	  of	  justification,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  between	  two	  rational	  
roles	  experiences	  can	  play.	  These	  roles	  can	  be	  elucidated	  using	  the	  notions	  of	  propositional	  
justification,	  which	  concerns	  (roughly)	  what	  reasons	  we	  have,	  and	  doxastic	  justification,	  which	  
concerns	  (roughly)	  how	  we	  respond	  to	  reasons	  we	  have.	  	  
Suppose	  you	  suspect	  that	  there	  is	  mustard	  in	  the	  fridge,	  and	  open	  the	  door	  to	  check.	  
There’s	  the	  mustard,	  in	  plain	  view.	  You	  see	  it,	  and	  notice	  it,	  and	  don’t	  suffer	  any	  illusion.	  
Whether	  or	  not	  you	  actually	  increase	  your	  confidence	  that	  there’s	  mustard	  in	  the	  fridge,	  it	  
would	  be	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  do	  so.	  	  We’ll	  say	  that	  an	  experience	  of	  a	  subject	  provides	  
propositional	  justification	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  provides	  justification	  for	  a	  proposition,	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  subject	  believes	  the	  proposition	  or	  adjusts	  her	  confidence	  in	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
experience.	  The	  notion	  of	  propositional	  justification	  arises	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  
kind	  of	  rational	  support	  a	  mental	  state	  provides	  for	  believing	  a	  proposition,	  while	  abstracting	  
away	  from	  the	  role	  it	  actually	  plays	  (if	  any)	  in	  the	  subject’s	  forming	  or	  maintaining	  a	  belief	  in	  
that	  proposition.	  
	   In	  contrast,	  the	  notion	  of	  doxastic	  justification	  arises	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  
rationally	  better	  and	  rationally	  worse	  ways	  to	  form	  and	  maintain	  beliefs.	  For	  instance,	  normally,	  
looking	  in	  the	  fridge	  is	  an	  epistemically	  good	  way	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  whether	  the	  fridge	  
contains	  mustard.	  The	  idea	  that	  experiences	  can	  lead	  to	  doxastically	  justified	  beliefs	  is	  closely	  
                                                
9	  Of	  course	  these	  characterizations	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  are	  exceedingly	  
simplified.	  
10	  This	  notion	  of	  justification	  leaves	  several	  substantive	  issues	  unsettled.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  tied	  by	  
definition	  to	  being	  able	  to	  produce	  explicit	  reasons,	  or	  to	  being	  blameless	  in	  forming	  or	  
maintaining	  a	  belief.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Pryor	  2001.	  Second,	  it	  is	  an	  open	  question	  exactly	  what	  
normative	  notion	  justification	  or	  epistemic	  rationality	  is.	  Standardly	  it	  is	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  
permissibility,	  so	  that	  justified	  beliefs	  are	  those	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  form	  (e.g.,	  Peacocke	  2004).	  
In	  some	  cases,	  obligation	  rather	  than	  permissibility	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  issue.	  For	  instance,	  in	  some	  
visual	  	  cases	  it	  is	  arguably	  irrational	  not	  to	  believe	  your	  eyes	  (see	  Jackson	  forthcoming,	  for	  
discussion),	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  it	  is	  arguably	  irrational	  not	  to	  believe	  obvious	  logical	  
consequences	  of	  what	  you	  already	  rationally	  believe.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  justification	  is	  
or	  is	  sometimes	  a	  type	  of	  correctness	  (such	  as	  ‘fittingness’)	  that	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  using	  a	  





related	  to	  the	  more	  general	  idea	  that	  some	  beliefs	  are	  based	  on	  experience,	  just	  as	  they	  can	  be	  
based	  on	  other	  beliefs.	  Very	  roughly,	  a	  belief	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  mental	  state	  M	  is	  a	  response	  to	  
M.	  Paradigmatically,	  your	  belief	  that	  you	  are	  hungry	  will	  be	  based	  on	  your	  feeling	  of	  hunger,	  
and	  your	  belief	  that	  tomorrow	  is	  Wednesday	  will	  be	  based	  on	  your	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  Tuesday.	  	  
Satisfactory	  analyses	  of	  the	  basing	  relation	  have	  proven	  elusive.	  But	  such	  a	  notion	  is	  needed	  if	  
there	  are	  rationally	  better	  and	  worse	  ways	  in	  which	  beliefs	  can	  be	  formed	  or	  maintained.11	  
We’ll	  say	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  doxastically	  justified	  by	  an	  experience	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  rationally	  
formed,	  adjusted	  or	  maintained	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  experience.	  (We	  can	  think	  of	  adjusting	  beliefs	  as	  
special	  cases	  of	  forming	  them).	  
	   In	  principle,	  one	  could	  approach	  the	  topic	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  by	  starting	  with	  
justified	  beliefs	  that	  are	  formed	  as	  the	  result	  of	  perception,	  and	  then	  ask:	  	  
	  
● What	  kind	  of	  process	  gave	  rise	  to	  that	  belief?	  	  
● Which	  aspects	  of	  the	  process,	  if	  any,	  made	  it	  a	  rational	  process	  by	  which	  to	  form	  the	  
belief?	  	  
● What	  role	  did	  the	  perceptual	  experience	  play	  in	  that	  process?	  	  
	  
Analogous	  questions	  could	  be	  asked	  for	  adjustments	  of	  beliefs.	  	  These	  questions	  look	  backward	  
at	  the	  etiology	  of	  the	  belief,	  and	  ask	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  belief’s	  etiology	  and	  its	  
epistemic	  status.	  
	  	   Our	  starting	  point	  is	  different.	  We	  focus	  mainly	  on	  propositional	  justification.	  Rather	  
than	  start	  with	  beliefs,	  we	  start	  with	  experiences	  and	  ask:	  	  	  
	  
● Given	  an	  experience,	  which	  propositions,	  if	  any,	  does	  this	  experience	  provide	  rational	  
support	  for	  believing? 
● Which	  features	  of	  the	  experience	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  it	  can	  provide	  rational	  support	  
for	  those	  propositions?	  	  
	  
These	  questions	  approach	  the	  topic	  by	  looking	  forward	  from	  experiences	  to	  the	  propositions	  
they	  rationally	  support.	  We	  can	  divide	  the	  features	  of	  experience	  that	  potentially	  explain	  what	  
makes	  them	  provide	  propositional	  justification	  into	  two	  broad	  categories:	  features	  related	  to	  
the	  constitutive	  nature	  of	  experience,	  and	  features	  related	  to	  the	  etiology	  of	  experience.	  Both	  
                                                
11	  One	  construal	  of	  basing	  allows	  for	  “bad	  basing”:	  a	  belief	  B	  can	  be	  based	  on	  a	  mental	  state	  M,	  
where	  M	  gives	  propositional	  justification	  to	  hold	  B,	  even	  if	  B	  is	  not	  thereby	  doxastically	  
justified.	  On	  this	  construal,	  an	  account	  of	  the	  basing	  relation	  must	  avoid	  mere	  causal	  or	  
counterfactual	  dependence,	  while	  still	  allowing	  for	  “bad	  basing”.	  This	  challenge	  is	  avoided	  by	  a	  
different	  construal	  of	  basing,	  on	  which	  basing	  B	  on	  a	  mental	  state	  which	  supplies	  propositional	  
justification	  for	  B’s	  content	  is	  sufficient	  for	  B	  to	  be	  doxastically	  justified.	  For	  further	  discussion	  
of	  the	  basing	  relation,	  see	  Lehrer	  (1971),	  Swain	  1979,	  Audi	  (1986),	  Korcz	  1997,	  Kvanvig	  (2003),	  





categories-­‐-­‐-­‐which	  are	  not	  exclusive-­‐-­‐-­‐are	  examined	  in	  Parts	  II	  and	  III.12	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  Part	  I,	  we	  
draw	  more	  distinctions	  within	  the	  basic	  normative	  notion	  of	  justification,	  to	  highlight	  different	  
aspects	  of	  normative	  support	  that	  experiences	  could	  in	  principle	  provide	  for	  beliefs.	  We	  begin	  
with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  experiences	  and	  prior	  beliefs	  rationally	  interact.	  
Suppose	  you	  know	  that	  it	  is	  unlikely	  for	  there	  to	  be	  mustard	  in	  the	  fridge,	  but	  when	  you	  
open	  the	  fridge	  door,	  you	  see	  some	  mustard	  (and	  it	  looks	  like	  mustard).	  In	  many	  cases,	  it	  seems	  
plain	  that	  you	  can	  rationally	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  mustard	  in	  the	  fridge,	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  your	  
experience.	  But	  is	  it	  always	  rational	  for	  experiences	  to	  override	  prior	  beliefs	  in	  this	  way?	  
Suppose	  you	  know	  there	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  water	  in	  the	  distance	  in	  the	  desert-­‐-­‐-­‐even	  if	  you	  seem	  
to	  see	  some-­‐-­‐-­‐and	  when	  you	  look	  ahead	  in	  the	  desert	  you	  seem	  to	  see	  a	  pool.	  	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  
the	  rational	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  presumably	  to	  raise	  your	  confidence	  that	  you	  are	  seeing	  a	  mirage,	  
rather	  than	  to	  revise	  your	  antecedent	  expectation.	  	  A	  theory	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  should	  
allow	  prior	  beliefs	  to	  influence	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  experiences.	  	  
When	  prior	  beliefs	  have	  a	  negative	  influence	  on	  the	  rational	  support	  provided	  by	  
experiences,	  they	  act	  as	  defeaters.13	  	  In	  a	  simple	  form	  of	  defeat,	  they	  remove	  all	  justificatory	  
force	  from	  experience.	  In	  more	  complex	  form	  of	  influence,	  prior	  beliefs	  reduce	  the	  justificatory	  
force	  that	  experiences	  provide	  without	  completely	  eliminating	  it.	  (Given	  the	  assumption	  that	  
the	  amount	  of	  justification	  one	  gains	  from	  experience	  can	  come	  in	  degrees,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  
assume	  that	  experiences	  can	  be	  defeated	  to	  various	  degrees	  as	  well.)14	  If	  the	  epistemic	  status	  
of	  experiences	  is	  sensitive	  to	  prior	  beliefs	  and	  their	  epistemic	  status,	  then	  a	  theory	  of	  
perceptual	  justification	  needs	  a	  way	  to	  describe	  this	  kind	  of	  sensitivity.	  For	  instance,	  one	  could	  
frame	  a	  theory	  around	  the	  question	  of	  which	  transitions	  to	  a	  new	  doxastic	  state	  are	  licensed	  by	  
                                                
12	  A	  feature	  of	  an	  experience	  could	  be	  both	  constitutive	  and	  causal.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  a	  
standard	  externalist	  theory	  of	  content-­‐determination	  inspired	  by	  Putnam’s	  theory	  of	  natural	  
kind	  terms	  (Putnam	  1975)	  and	  Burge’s	  theory	  of	  deference	  (Burge	  1982),	  a	  mental	  state	  has	  the	  
content	  it	  does	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  state’s	  standing	  in	  certain	  causal	  relations	  (roughly,	  a	  mental	  
state	  represents	  redness	  if	  it	  tends	  to	  be	  tokened	  by	  red	  things).	  If	  a	  mental	  state	  is	  partly	  
constituted	  by	  having	  the	  contents	  it	  does,	  then	  according	  to	  these	  externalist	  theories,	  having	  
those	  contents	  is	  both	  a	  constitutive	  feature	  of	  the	  state	  and	  a	  causal	  feature	  of	  it.	  Externalist	  
theories	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  contents	  of	  visual	  experiences	  by	  Dretske	  1997,	  Tye	  1995,	  Lycan	  
2001,	  Burge	  2003,	  2010,	  Stalnaker	  2003.	  Lycan	  and	  Dretske	  identify	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  
of	  experiences	  with	  the	  property	  of	  having	  specific	  content.	  Once	  that	  move	  is	  made,	  
phenomenal	  character	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  feature	  of	  experience	  that	  is	  both	  constitutive	  
and	  causal.	  For	  an	  application	  of	  externalist	  views	  of	  content	  to	  the	  project	  of	  explaining	  how	  
experiences	  justify	  beliefs,	  see	  Burge	  2003,	  Peacocke	  2004,	  and	  Majors	  and	  Sawyer	  2005.	  	  For	  a	  
use	  of	  such	  views	  to	  respond	  to	  skepticism,	  see	  Putnam	  1981,	  ch.	  1,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  
Brueckner	  1992,	  Warfield	  1998,	  and	  DeRose	  2000.	  	  
13	  One	  might	  say	  that	  prior	  beliefs	  as	  such	  are	  never	  defeaters,	  instead	  ascribing	  all	  negative	  
effects	  of	  defeat	  to	  one’s	  justification	  to	  have	  to	  those	  beliefs,	  so	  that	  an	  unjustified	  belief	  
would	  never	  have	  a	  defeating	  effect.	  	  For	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue,	  see	  Pryor	  2004.	  
14	  A	  third	  form	  of	  defeat	  allows	  defeated	  experiences	  to	  retain	  all	  their	  justificatory	  force,	  and	  





an	  experience,	  given	  one’s	  initial	  overall	  doxastic	  state.15	  This	  framework	  employs	  the	  basic	  
normative	  notion	  of	  justification	  to	  describe	  changes	  in	  overall	  doxastic	  states.	  
It	  is	  one	  thing	  for	  prior	  beliefs	  to	  defeat	  an	  experience	  as	  a	  source	  of	  rational	  support	  for	  
a	  belief.	  It	  is	  another	  for	  prior	  beliefs	  always	  to	  be	  needed,	  for	  experiences	  to	  provide	  rational	  
support	  at	  all.	  The	  idea	  that	  prior	  beliefs	  are	  not	  always	  needed	  can	  be	  sharpened	  by	  the	  notion	  
of	  immediate	  justification.16	  Intuitively,	  when	  you	  know	  you	  are	  in	  pain,	  the	  only	  source	  of	  
justification	  you	  are	  relying	  on	  is	  the	  pain	  itself.	  You	  are	  not	  relying	  on	  separate	  grounds	  for	  
believing	  that	  your	  pain	  beliefs	  are	  reliable,	  or	  on	  background	  beliefs	  that	  identify	  your	  
sensation	  as	  a	  pain.	  Your	  pain	  instead	  gives	  you	  justification	  to	  believe	  you	  are	  in	  pain	  in	  a	  way	  
which	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  your	  having	  reason	  to	  hold	  any	  other	  beliefs.17	  When	  applied	  to	  
perceptual	  experiences,	  the	  notion	  of	  immediate	  justification	  figures	  in	  defenses	  of	  
foundationalism,	  the	  view	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  all	  beliefs	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  a	  special	  
class	  of	  beliefs,	  which	  need	  not	  themselves	  be	  justified	  by	  relations	  to	  any	  other	  beliefs.18	  The	  
notion	  also	  figures	  in	  responses	  to	  skepticism	  about	  knowledge	  and	  justification	  along	  the	  lines	  
of	  G.E.	  Moore,	  who	  claimed	  to	  refute	  the	  skeptic	  by	  looking	  at	  his	  hands.	  (We	  discuss	  Moore’s	  
reasoning	  below).	  
Even	  if	  experiences	  sometimes	  provide	  immediate	  justification,	  having	  an	  experience	  
need	  not	  suffice	  to	  provide	  any	  kind	  of	  justification.	  Suppose	  that	  your	  hand-­‐experience	  (call	  it	  
                                                
15	  For	  approaches	  of	  this	  sort,	  see	  Gupta	  2006.	  
16	  For	  defenses	  of	  the	  thesis	  that	  our	  experiences	  immediately	  justify	  some	  external	  world	  	  
beliefs,	  see	  Chisholm	  1966,	  Pollock	  1974,	  Pryor	  2000	  and	  2004,	  Huemer	  2001,	  Burge	  2003,	  
Feldman	  2003,	  Peacocke	  2004,	  Goldman	  2008,	  Silins	  2008,	  Tucker	  2010.	  
17	  Immediate	  justification	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  mediate	  justification.	  	  
	  
Your	  experience	  E	  gives	  you	  mediate	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  P	  just	  in	  case	  E	  gives	  
you	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  P,	  in	  a	  way	  which	  depends	  on	  your	  having	  justification	  to	  
believe	  some	  proposition,	  from	  some	  source	  other	  than	  E.	  	  
	  
For	  example,	  your	  experience	  gives	  you	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  will	  rain,	  in	  a	  way	  which	  
depends	  on	  your	  having	  justification	  from	  memory	  to	  believe	  that,	  if	  there	  are	  dark	  clouds,	  then	  
it	  will	  rain.	  Immediate	  justification	  can	  now	  be	  defined	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
E	  gives	  you	  immediate	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  just	  in	  case	  E	  gives	  you	  justification	  
to	  believe	  that	  p	  that	  is	  not	  mediate	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  P.	  
	  
This	  definition	  allows	  that	  an	  experience	  can	  immediately	  justify	  a	  subject	  in	  believing	  more	  
than	  one	  proposition,	  such	  as	  the	  proposition	  that	  you	  have	  hands,	  and	  the	  proposition	  that	  
you	  are	  seeing	  your	  hands,	  so	  long	  as	  E	  is	  the	  sole	  source	  on	  which	  you	  are	  relying	  for	  
justification	  in	  believing	  both	  propositions.	  For	  further	  clarification	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  immediate	  
justification,	  see	  Audi	  (1993),	  Pryor	  (2000,	  2005),	  Silins	  (2008),	  and	  McGrath	  (forthcoming).	  
18	  For	  discussion	  of	  foundationalism,	  see	  Bonjour	  1985,	  Audi	  1993:	  chapters	  1-­‐4,	  DePaul	  2000,	  





E)	  provides	  immediate	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  you	  have	  hands.	  Some	  contingent	  factor	  
might	  still	  need	  to	  be	  added	  to	  E,	  in	  order	  for	  E	  to	  immediately	  justify	  this	  proposition	  (or	  any	  
other).	  For	  example,	  E	  might	  need	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  process	  that	  reliably	  produces	  true	  beliefs,	  or	  
it	  might	  need	  to	  be	  a	  case	  of	  seeing.	  We	  can	  thus	  distinguish	  between	  two	  theses	  concerning	  
immediate	  justification	  by	  experience.	  
	  
Immediacy:	  For	  some	  external-­‐world	  proposition	  P,	  there	  is	  an	  experience	  E	  which	  provides	  
immediate	  justification	  for	  P.	  	  
	  	  
Sufficiency-­‐for-­‐IJ:	  Necessarily,	  if	  you	  have	  an	  experience	  E	  with	  content	  P,	  then	  E	  gives	  you	  
immediate	  justification	  for	  P.	  
	  	  
	   Immediacy	  does	  not	  pin	  down	  what	  makes	  a	  transition	  from	  experience	  to	  belief	  
rational,	  when	  the	  experience	  would	  (or	  does)	  immediately	  justify	  the	  belief.	  It	  is	  a	  theory	  
about	  the	  structure	  of	  justification,	  not	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  confers	  justification.	  	  In	  Parts	  II	  
and	  III,	  we	  examine	  factors	  that	  have	  been	  thought	  to	  confer	  immediate	  justification.	  	  
The	  Sufficiency-­‐for-­‐IJ	  thesis	  bears	  on	  a	  central	  question	  in	  epistemology.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  
carve	  perceptual	  justification	  at	  its	  joints,	  will	  experience	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  basic	  element	  in	  the	  
story,	  or	  will	  the	  most	  basic	  elements	  be	  combinations	  of	  experiences	  with	  other	  factors	  (such	  
as	  beliefs,	  inferential	  dispositions,	  or	  other	  mental	  states)	  or	  other	  non-­‐mental	  factors	  (such	  as	  
causes	  of	  the	  experience)?	  Immediacy	  leaves	  both	  options	  open,	  whereas	  Sufficiency-­‐for-­‐IJ	  
entails	  that	  experiences	  are	  joints	  in	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  justification.	  Just	  what	  else	  besides	  a	  
phenomenal	  state	  constitutes	  the	  joint	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  ultimate	  explanation	  for	  what	  makes	  
the	  experience	  provide	  immediate	  justification.	  
	   As	  stated,	  the	  Sufficiency-­‐for-­‐IJ	  entails	  that	  an	  experience	  provides	  justification,	  even	  if	  
you	  know	  that	  you’re	  hallucinating.	  But	  arguably,	  you	  should	  lower	  your	  confidence.	  To	  avoid	  
the	  result	  that	  you	  shouldn’t	  lower	  your	  confidence,	  the	  Sufficiency-­‐for-­‐IJ	  thesis	  could	  be	  
modified	  using	  the	  notion	  of	  prima-­‐facie	  justification.	  	  A	  subject’s	  knowledge	  that	  she	  is	  
hallucinating	  is	  a	  paradigm	  of	  a	  defeater	  for	  the	  experience.19	  An	  experience	  provides	  prima-­‐
facie	  justification	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  provides	  justification,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  defeaters.20	  Here’s	  the	  
thesis	  modified:	  
	  
Sufficiency-­‐for-­‐pf-­‐IJ:	  Necessarily,	  if	  you	  have	  an	  experience	  E	  with	  content	  P,	  then	  E	  
gives	  you	  prima-­‐facie	  immediate	  justification	  for	  P.	  
	  
                                                
19	  For	  more	  on	  defeat,	  see	  Pollock	  1986	  and	  Pollock	  and	  Cruz	  1999,	  Bergmann	  2006,	  ch	  5,	  Pryor	  
(forthcoming),	  Kotzen	  (forthcoming),	  or	  Silins	  (forthcoming-­‐a).	  
20	  It	  is	  a	  further	  question	  to	  what	  degree	  defeaters	  reduce	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  experience	  





Once	  the	  notion	  of	  prima-­‐facie	  justification	  is	  on	  the	  table,	  other	  sufficiency	  theses	  can	  be	  
defined	  independently	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  immediate	  justification.21	  Like	  the	  other	  sufficiency	  
theses,	  these	  too	  entail	  that	  experiences	  form	  a	  joint	  in	  the	  overall	  structure	  of	  justification.	  
	   We	  now	  turn	  from	  exposition	  of	  theses	  concerning	  immediate	  justification	  to	  their	  
evaluation.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  experiences	  can	  provide	  immediate	  justification	  at	  all	  has	  been	  
challenged	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  attributes	  to	  experiences	  more	  justificatory	  power	  than	  they	  
have.	  We	  describe	  two	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  challenges	  of	  this	  sort.22	  
First,	  Immediacy	  seems	  to	  allow	  that	  we	  have	  justification	  from	  experience	  to	  believe	  
the	  following	  Moorean	  premise,	  without	  having	  to	  already	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  
Moorean	  conclusion.	  	  
	  
Moorean	  Premise:	  I	  have	  hands.	  
Link:	  If	  I	  have	  hands,	  then	  I	  am	  not	  a	  handless	  brain	  in	  a	  vat.	  
So,	  
Moorean	  Conclusion:	  I	  am	  not	  a	  handless	  brain	  in	  vat.	  
	  
But	  if	  one	  has	  immediate	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  argument,	  nothing	  would	  
seem	  to	  bar	  one	  from	  acquiring	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  conclusion	  simply	  by	  deducing	  it	  
from	  the	  premise.	  	  According	  to	  the	  easy	  justification	  objection,	  Immediacy	  allows	  one	  to	  gain	  
justification	  to	  reject	  skeptical	  hypotheses	  too	  easily.23	  After	  all,	  if	  one	  were	  a	  handless	  brain	  in	  
a	  vat,	  one’s	  hands-­‐experience	  would	  be	  inaccurate.	  According	  to	  the	  objector,	  we	  cannot	  rely	  
on	  experience	  itself	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  its	  own	  accuracy.	  (Compare:	  we	  arguably	  cannot	  
rely	  on	  witnesses	  to	  testify	  to	  their	  own	  accuracy).	  If	  so,	  then	  we	  cannot	  become	  justified	  in	  
                                                
21	  For	  instance,	  the	  weaker	  thesis	  that	  for	  some	  proposition	  P,	  there	  is	  a	  phenomenal	  type	  of	  
experience	  E	  such	  that	  having	  E	  suffices	  to	  provide	  prima-­‐facie	  justification	  for	  P.	  This	  view	  is	  
suggested	  by	  Peacocke	  2004,	  chapter	  1.	  	  For	  useful	  further	  discussion	  of	  different	  Sufficiency	  
theses,	  see	  Graham	  (2006).	  
22	  Other	  challenges	  for	  the	  Sufficiency	  theses	  are	  surveyed	  in	  sections	  8-­‐10.	  	  A	  further	  challenge	  
comes	  from	  the	  example	  of	  the	  “speckled	  hen”,	  which	  goes	  back	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  Chisholm	  
(1942)-­‐-­‐-­‐if	  you	  see	  a	  speckled	  hen	  in	  good	  conditions,	  and	  the	  side	  facing	  you	  has	  say	  39	  
speckles,	  does	  your	  experience	  both	  represent	  that	  there	  are	  39	  speckles	  and	  give	  you	  
justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  39	  speckles?	  	  For	  discussion	  of	  how	  much	  detail	  our	  
experiences	  represent,	  and	  of	  whether	  they	  give	  us	  justification	  to	  believe	  their	  most	  specific	  
contents,	  see	  Sosa	  (2003),	  Feldman	  (2004),	  Fumerton	  (2005,	  2009),	  Tye	  (2009),	  Markie	  (2009),	  
Pace	  (2010)	  and	  Smithies	  (ms).	  	  For	  further	  challenges	  to	  Sufficiency	  theses,	  see	  Steup	  (2004)	  or	  
Wright	  (2007).	  
23	  We	  use	  the	  term	  “easy	  justification”	  to	  echo	  Cohen	  (2002)’s	  discussion	  of	  “easy	  knowledge”.	  	  
See	  also	  Wright	  (1985,	  2000),	  Cohen	  2002	  and	  2005,	  White	  2006,	  Kotzen	  (ms).	  
For	  discussion	  of	  probabilistic	  considerations	  about	  whether	  the	  inference	  is	  capable	  of	  
enhancing	  one’s	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  conclusion,	  see	  Okasha	  (2004),	  White	  2006,	  





rejecting	  skeptical	  hypotheses	  by	  the	  inference	  corresponding	  to	  the	  argument	  above.	  And	  if	  
we	  cannot	  gain	  justification	  to	  reject	  skeptical	  hypotheses	  by	  performing	  such	  inferences,	  the	  
objector	  says,	  we	  do	  not	  gain	  immediate	  justification	  from	  our	  experiences	  for	  external	  world	  
beliefs	  either.24	  
Proponents	  of	  Immediacy	  have	  several	  lines	  of	  response	  to	  this	  argument.	  A	  first	  
response	  embraces	  the	  Moorean	  reasoning,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  inference	  can	  indeed	  be	  
successful,	  and	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  can’t	  provide	  justification	  can	  be	  explained	  away.	  For	  instance,	  
the	  inference	  might	  merely	  seem	  defective,	  because	  of	  its	  dialectical	  impotence	  to	  persuade	  an	  
interlocutor	  who	  doubts	  the	  conclusion,	  leaving	  open	  that	  it	  provides	  justification	  for	  the	  
subject	  who	  performs	  the	  inference.25	  Compare:	  when	  I	  reason	  that	  I	  must	  exist	  given	  that	  I	  am	  
thinking,	  I	  acquire	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  exist	  in	  a	  perfectly	  legitimate	  way,	  despite	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  reasoning	  will	  probably	  not	  rationally	  persuade	  someone	  who	  doubts	  that	  I	  exist.	  	  
Alternatively,	  perhaps	  the	  inference	  seems	  defective	  because	  we	  underestimate	  what	  justifies	  
the	  subject	  in	  believing	  the	  Moorean	  premise.	  	  If	  the	  experiences	  that	  justify	  one	  in	  believing	  
the	  Moorean	  premise	  are	  also	  states	  of	  seeing	  hands	  (as	  we’ll	  discuss	  in	  section	  7),	  then	  the	  
state	  which	  justifies	  one	  in	  believing	  the	  Moorean	  premise	  guarantees	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  
Moorean	  conclusion.	  According	  to	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  an	  experience	  that	  can	  be	  had,	  only	  if	  
the	  Moorean	  conclusion	  is	  true,	  is	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  providing	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  
Moorean	  conclusion.26	  	  
A	  second	  response	  to	  the	  easy-­‐justification	  objection	  denies	  that	  Immediacy	  
legitimates	  Moorean	  reasoning.	  According	  to	  this	  response,	  the	  hand-­‐experience	  gives	  one	  
immediate	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  hands,	  without	  providing	  justification	  (via	  
inference)	  to	  deny	  that	  one	  is	  a	  handless	  brain	  in	  a	  vat.	  	  One	  possibility	  here	  is	  that	  an	  
experience	  could	  give	  one	  immediate	  justification	  to	  believe	  an	  ordinary	  proposition	  about	  the	  
external	  world,	  while	  one	  fails	  to	  have	  any	  justification	  to	  reject	  the	  skeptical	  
hypothesis.27	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  when	  an	  experience	  gives	  one	  immediate	  justification	  
to	  believe	  an	  ordinary	  proposition	  about	  the	  external	  world,	  one	  has	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  
justification	  to	  reject	  the	  skeptical	  hypothesis,	  even	  though	  that	  independent	  source	  is	  not	  part	  
of	  what	  gives	  one	  perceptual	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  ordinary	  proposition	  in	  the	  first	  
place.28	  	  Compare:	  whenever	  you	  have	  perceptual	  justification	  to	  believe	  you	  have	  hands,	  you	  
have	  independent	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  triviality	  that	  all	  hands	  are	  hands,	  but	  you	  do	  not	  
                                                
24	  The	  argument	  can	  be	  expanded	  into	  one	  for	  skepticism,	  when	  combined	  with	  the	  further	  
claim	  that	  nothing	  other	  than	  an	  experience	  could	  justify	  one	  in	  rejecting	  skeptical	  hypotheses,	  
and	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  must	  have	  justification	  to	  reject	  skeptical	  hypotheses	  to	  have	  
justification	  from	  our	  experiences.	  	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Pryor	  (2000),	  Wright	  (2004),	  or	  
Weatherson	  (2005).	  
25	  Pryor	  2004,	  Davies	  2004,	  and	  Markie	  2005	  make	  this	  response,	  which	  is	  criticized	  by	  Cohen	  
2005.	  
26	  For	  defense	  see	  McDowell	  1995,	  2008,	  for	  criticism	  see	  Wright	  2002.	  
27	  This	  move	  holds	  that	  you	  can	  have	  justification	  for	  P,	  know	  that	  P	  entails	  Q,	  yet	  lack	  
justification	  for	  Q.	  It	  is	  defended	  by	  Dretske	  1970	  and	  criticized	  by	  White	  2006.	  	  





have	  perceptual	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  you	  have	  hands	  in	  virtue	  of	  having	  independent	  
reason	  to	  believe	  that	  all	  hands	  are	  hands.	  
Like	  the	  easy-­‐justification	  objection	  to	  Immediacy,	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection	  develops	  
the	  idea	  that	  Immediacy	  makes	  justification	  too	  easy.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Bootstrapping	  
objection,	  Immediacy	  implies	  that	  one’s	  experiences	  can	  give	  one	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  
they	  themselves	  are	  reliable,	  where	  experiences	  have	  no	  power	  to	  do	  any	  such	  thing.29	  Suppose	  
one	  forms	  a	  series	  of	  justified	  beliefs	  of	  this	  form:	  
	  
It	  visually	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  something	  at	  location	  L	  has	  F,	  and	  something	  at	  L	  has	  
property	  F.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  objection,	  one	  could	  then	  deduce	  that	  one’s	  experiences	  were	  accurate	  on	  all	  
the	  occasions	  surveyed,	  and	  one	  could	  then	  rationally	  conclude	  by	  induction	  that	  one’s	  
experiences	  are	  reliable-­‐-­‐-­‐why	  else	  would	  they	  have	  been	  accurate	  on	  all	  those	  occasions?	  	  
A	  natural	  way	  to	  block	  the	  bootstrapping	  inference	  would	  be	  to	  propose	  that	  an	  
experience	  justifies	  one	  in	  believing	  that	  P,	  only	  if	  one	  already	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  
experience	  is	  a	  reliable	  source.	  	  But	  this	  response	  seems	  to	  compromise	  the	  status	  of	  
justification	  as	  immediate.	  	  
Just	  as	  the	  proponent	  of	  Immediacy	  could	  embrace	  the	  Moorean	  reasoning	  above,	  here	  
too,	  a	  first	  response	  to	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection	  is	  to	  maintain	  that	  we	  can	  have	  justification,	  
via	  experience,	  to	  believe	  our	  experiences	  are	  reliable,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  
only	  possible	  source	  of	  justification	  to	  believe	  they	  are	  reliable,	  barring	  a	  great	  expansion	  of	  the	  
domain	  of	  a	  priori	  justification.30	  	  
A	  second	  response	  holds	  that	  the	  domain	  of	  a	  priori	  justification	  is	  indeed	  wider	  than	  we	  
might	  have	  thought.	  We	  have	  a	  priori	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one’s	  experiences	  are	  reliable	  
thanks	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  what	  Wedgwood	  calls	  an	  “a	  priori	  bootstrapping”	  argument.31	  	  	  	  
When	  reasoning	  through	  such	  an	  argument,	  one	  would	  suppose	  that	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  
with	  the	  content	  that	  p,	  and	  then	  infers	  that,	  on	  the	  supposition	  one	  has	  the	  experience	  with	  
the	  content	  that	  p,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  p.	  	  One	  could	  then	  conclude	  that,	  if	  one	  has	  the	  experience	  
with	  the	  content	  that	  p,	  p.	  	  	  
	  
	  
A	  third	  response	  is	  that	  bootstrapping	  reasoning	  uses	  a	  defective	  form	  of	  induction,	  
where	  the	  defect	  has	  nothing	  specific	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  experiences	  ever	  immediately	  justify	  
                                                
29	  Varieties	  of	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection	  are	  made	  by	  Cohen	  2002,	  2005,	  and	  White	  2006.	  	  
The	  problem	  is	  discussed	  with	  reference	  to	  reliabilist	  views	  by	  Fumerton	  1995	  and	  Vogel	  2000	  
and	  2008.	  	  	  
30	  For	  discussion	  of	  responses	  along	  these	  lines,	  see	  Sosa	  (1997),	  Van	  Cleve	  2003,	  Bergmann	  
2004,	  Brown	  2004	  and	  Kornblith	  2009.	  For	  an	  application	  of	  analogous	  reasoning	  to	  the	  case	  of	  
deductive	  inference,	  see	  Boghossian	  2000.	  
31	  One	  might	  wonder	  how	  the	  response	  is	  compatible	  with	  claims	  like	  Immediacy,	  for	  discussion	  





beliefs.	  This	  response	  entails	  that	  Immediacy	  makes	  no	  prediction	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  
bootstrapping	  reasoning.32	  
If	  these	  objections	  can	  be	  answered,	  then	  a	  further	  question	  is:	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  do	  
experiences	  provide	  immediate	  justification?	  If	  the	  objections	  stand,	  then	  our	  starting	  question	  
remains:	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  do	  experiences	  provide	  justification	  at	  all,	  whether	  it	  is	  immediate	  or	  
not?	  In	  principle,	  the	  same	  answers	  may	  apply	  to	  both	  questions.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  two	  types	  of	  
answers:	  those	  that	  invoke	  constitutive	  features	  of	  experience,	  and	  those	  that	  invoke	  causal	  
features	  of	  experience.	  
	  
Part	  II.	  Constitutive	  features	  of	  experience	  
	  
3.	  The	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  
According	  to	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach,	  experiences	  provide	  justification	  at	  least	  partly	  
in	  virtue	  of	  either	  their	  phenomenal	  character.33	  Some	  proponents	  of	  the	  Phenomenal	  
Approach	  motivate	  it	  by	  contrasting	  the	  epistemic	  situation	  of	  sighted	  and	  blindsighted	  
subjects.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  a	  sighted	  subject	  who	  enjoys	  a	  visual	  experience	  of	  a	  basketball,	  
while	  a	  blindsighted	  subject	  has	  no	  experience	  of	  the	  ball	  but	  nevertheless	  registers	  its	  
presence	  in	  unconscious	  perceptual	  processing.	  Across	  a	  range	  of	  cases,	  both	  subjects	  reliably	  
form	  accurate	  judgments	  about	  whether	  a	  basketball	  is	  present.	  If	  the	  sighted	  subject	  has	  more	  
justification	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  ball	  is	  there,	  or	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  justification,	  then	  one	  might	  
think	  that	  the	  justificatory	  difference	  is	  due	  to	  the	  conscious	  character	  of	  her	  experience,	  since	  
the	  conscious	  and	  the	  unconscious	  perception	  are	  so	  similar	  in	  their	  other	  features.34	  	  	  
Smithies	  (2011)	  draws	  on	  principles	  to	  give	  a	  direct	  argument	  for	  the	  Phenomenal	  
Approach	  by	  appealing	  to	  a	  version	  of	  access	  internalism	  about	  justification,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
factors	  that	  determine	  whether	  a	  subject	  is	  justified	  in	  believing	  a	  proposition	  are	  both	  internal	  
and	  accessible	  to	  the	  subject.35	  According	  to	  Smithies,	  the	  introspective	  accessibility	  of	  the	  
sighted	  subject’s	  visual	  experience	  enables	  it	  to	  provide	  justification,	  whereas	  the	  introspective	  
inaccessibility	  of	  the	  blind-­‐sighter’s	  subpersonal	  state	  makes	  it	  unable	  to	  provide	  justification.36	  
Other	  philosophers	  defend	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  indirectly,	  by	  first	  arguing	  that	  
phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  is	  directly	  implicated	  in	  other	  features	  of	  experiences,	  and	  
that	  these	  features	  in	  turn	  help	  explain	  how	  experiences	  justify	  external	  world	  	  beliefs.	  Some	  
                                                
32	  Weisberg	  2010.	  
33	  Campbell	  2002,	  Pryor	  2000,	  Huemer	  2001,	  2006,	  2007,	  Peacocke	  2004,	  Johnston	  2006,	  Silins	  
2008,	  forthcoming-­‐a	  Smithies	  forthcoming	  a	  and	  b.	  	  
34	  Not	  all	  theorists	  will	  agree	  that	  the	  sighted	  subject	  has	  more	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  an	  
orange	  sphere	  is	  present,	  or	  even	  be	  disposed	  to	  make	  the	  intuitive	  judgment	  that	  the	  sighted	  
subject	  has	  more	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  an	  orange	  sphere	  is	  present.	  See	  Lyons	  2009,	  also	  
Burge	  2003.	  	  
35	  Feldman	  and	  Conee	  2001.	  
36	  For	  criticism	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  only	  introspectively	  accessible	  perceptual	  states	  can	  play	  





features	  of	  experience	  potentially	  tied	  to	  phenomenal	  character	  in	  this	  way	  include	  attention,37	  
states	  of	  seeing,38	  and	  being	  a	  state	  of	  seeming	  with	  accuracy	  conditions.39	  	  
The	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  could	  also	  be	  bolstered	  by	  a	  conception	  of	  phenomenal	  
character	  of	  perceptual	  experiences	  that	  fits	  naturally	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  experiences	  have	  
accuracy	  conditions.	  This	  conception	  of	  phenomenal	  character	  has	  two	  strands.	  	  The	  first	  strand	  
is	  that	  phenomenal	  character	  conveys	  information	  about	  external	  objects.	  The	  idea	  that	  
experiences	  provide	  justification	  for	  external	  world	  	  beliefs	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  phenomenal	  
character	  might	  well	  seem	  less	  compelling,	  against	  the	  background	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  a	  raw	  
feel	  or	  mere	  sensory	  affect	  that	  does	  not	  present	  any	  properties	  as	  being	  instantiated	  in	  the	  
space	  around	  the	  perceiver.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  Laurence	  BonJour	  (2001),	  in	  virtue	  of	  
their	  phenomenal	  character,	  experiences	  immediately	  justify	  self-­‐ascriptions	  of	  experiences,	  
but	  not	  external	  world	  beliefs.	  Perhaps	  BonJour	  was	  drawn	  to	  this	  position	  by	  his	  assumption	  
that	  one	  could	  only	  describe	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  “in	  terms	  of	  patches	  of	  
color	  arranged	  in	  two-­‐dimensional	  visual	  space”	  (2001,	  p.	  32).	  Likewise,	  if	  Davidson	  had	  thought	  
that	  experiences	  were	  belief-­‐like	  in	  ways	  that	  allowed	  their	  contents	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  same	  kinds	  
of	  relations	  (such	  as	  entailment	  or	  probabilification)	  that	  the	  contents	  of	  beliefs	  stand	  in	  to	  one	  
another,	  perhaps	  he	  would	  not	  have	  excluded	  experiences	  from	  the	  states	  that	  he	  thought	  
could	  justify	  beliefs.	  	  
The	  second	  strand	  is	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  takes	  a	  stand	  on	  how	  things	  are	  in	  
the	  space	  around	  the	  perceiver.	  This	  putative	  aspect	  of	  phenomenal	  character,	  or	  something	  
like	  it,	  has	  been	  discussed	  under	  various	  labels,	  including	  assertoric,	  phenomenal	  or	  coercive	  
force,	  in	  parallel	  with	  Frege’s	  idea	  that	  assertoric	  sentences	  have	  forces	  in	  addition	  to	  senses.40	  
We	  discuss	  phenomenal	  force	  in	  section	  4,	  and	  its	  potential	  link	  to	  accuracy	  conditions	  in	  
section	  5.	  In	  section	  6	  we	  discuss	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  specific	  objects	  and	  properties	  that	  figure	  in	  
the	  contents	  of	  experience	  constrain	  the	  propositions	  that	  the	  experiences	  can	  justify.	  
	  
	  
4.	  Phenomenal	  force	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  can	  fix	  on	  the	  phenomenal	  force	  of	  perceptual	  experiences	  by	  contrasting	  it	  with	  
other	  kinds	  of	  phenomenal	  character.	  	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  
character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  imagery,	  
episodes	  of	  wondering,	  and	  pangs	  of	  desire	  -­‐	  even	  when	  these	  states	  are	  all	  directed	  toward	  
the	  same	  thing.	  Roughly,	  our	  perceptual	  experience	  purports	  to	  reveal	  how	  the	  world	  is,	  
whereas	  visualizing	  the	  dot,	  wondering	  whether	  there	  is	  such	  a	  black	  dot	  in	  front	  of	  you,	  or	  
feeling	  a	  pang	  of	  desire	  for	  a	  black	  dot	  does	  not.	  
	   Phenomenal	  force	  is	  analogous	  to	  assertoric	  force,	  but	  only	  to	  its	  role	  for	  the	  speaker.	  
Normally,	  when	  you	  hear	  someone	  else	  assert	  a	  declarative	  sentence,	  you	  register	  the	  
                                                
37	  Campbell	  2002,	  Dickie	  2011.	  
38	  McDowell	  1995	  and	  2008,	  Peacocke	  2004,	  Johnston	  2006,	  Campbell	  2002,	  Neta	  2003,	  2011,	  
Jackson	  2010.	  
39	  Feldman	  2003,	  Huemer	  2006.	  





assertoric	  force	  attached	  to	  what	  they	  say,	  but	  you	  need	  not	  thereby	  feel	  any	  coercion	  to	  
believe	  it.	  You	  might	  feel	  no	  inclination	  whatsoever	  to	  believe	  what	  you’re	  told.	  In	  contrast,	  
making	  an	  assertion	  is	  a	  way	  to	  express	  how	  you	  believe	  things	  to	  be.	  Similarly,	  perceptual	  
experience	  is	  a	  way	  to	  take	  in	  how	  things	  seem	  to	  you	  to	  be.	  Phenomenal	  force	  is	  analogous	  to	  
assertoric	  force	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  both	  attach	  to	  belief-­‐like	  states.	  	  
	   The	  phenomenal	  force	  that	  attaches	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  been	  thought	  to	  help	  
explain	  apparent	  epistemological	  differences	  between	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  other	  kinds	  
of	  mental	  states.	  41	  For	  instance,	  phenomenal	  force	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  answer	  “Sellars’s	  
Dilemma”	  (Sellars	  1956).	  	  On	  one	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  if	  the	  Premise	  Principle	  is	  true,	  and	  
experiences	  must	  assertively	  represent	  propositions	  to	  justify	  beliefs	  in	  those	  propositions,	  
then	  experiences	  must	  themselves	  be	  justified	  in	  order	  to	  justify,	  and	  no	  longer	  can	  serve	  as	  
stoppers	  of	  regresses	  regarding	  the	  justification	  of	  beliefs.	  	  Roughly	  speaking,	  here	  experiences	  
are	  allegedly	  too	  similar	  to	  beliefs.	  	  On	  the	  other	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  if	  the	  Premise	  Principle	  is	  
false,	  and	  experiences	  need	  not	  assertively	  represent	  propositions	  in	  order	  to	  justify,	  it	  is	  no	  
longer	  clear	  how	  experiences	  are	  capable	  of	  justifying	  beliefs	  at	  all.	  	  Here,	  experiences	  are	  
allegedly	  too	  dissimilar	  from	  beliefs.42	  	  
Do	  perceptual	  experiences	  really	  enjoy	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  phenomenal	  force,	  a	  kind	  
that	  imagery	  lacks?	  According	  to	  a	  Humean	  line	  of	  objection	  to	  this	  idea,	  there	  is	  no	  deep	  
difference	  in	  kind	  between	  visualizing	  and	  visual	  experience,	  only	  a	  difference	  of	  degree.	  	  Visual	  
experience	  is	  not	  distinguished	  from	  visualizing	  by	  its	  phenomenal	  force,	  but	  instead	  only	  by	  
the	  greater	  determinacy	  of	  its	  content.	  	  The	  epistemic	  role	  of	  visual	  experience,	  according	  to	  
the	  Humean	  we	  have	  in	  mind,	  is	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  determinacy	  of	  its	  content.	  	  
This	  objection	  fails,	  if	  there	  are	  perceptual	  experiences	  with	  less	  determinate	  content	  
than	  imagination,	  but	  which	  still	  provide	  better	  justification.	  For	  instance,	  a	  degraded	  visual	  
experience	  of	  a	  tomato	  in	  poor	  lighting	  might	  still	  provide	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  round	  
thing	  is	  present,	  whereas	  one	  might	  think	  that	  your	  imagining	  a	  tomato,	  no	  matter	  how	  vividly,	  
does	  not	  give	  you	  any	  justification	  at	  all	  to	  believe	  this.43	  	  
A	  classic	  experiment	  done	  by	  Perky	  (1910)	  suggests	  that	  phenomenal	  force	  may	  not	  
be	  pervasive	  among	  visual	  perceptual	  experiences.	  Subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  look	  at	  a	  screen	  and	  
to	  imagine	  a	  red	  dot.	  A	  faint	  red	  dot	  was	  projected	  onto	  the	  back	  of	  a	  white	  screen.	  Most	  
                                                
41.	  	  A	  further	  question	  concerns	  whether	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  waking	  visual	  experiences	  is	  
ever	  present	  when	  one	  dreams.	  	  For	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  its	  significance	  for	  
skeptical	  arguments	  involving	  considerations	  about	  dreaming,	  see	  Sosa	  (2005)	  and	  Ichikawa	  
(2008).	  
42 For	  discussion	  of	  Sellars’s	  dilemma,	  see	  Sellars	  (1956),	  Bonjour	  (1985),	  Burge	  (2003),	  Pryor	  
(2005),	  Huemer	  2007,	  and	  Lyons	  (2008).	  
43	  For	  discussion,	  see	  McGinn	  (2004).	  A	  separate	  question	  concerns	  the	  scope	  of	  phenomenal	  
force.	  	  Consider	  your	  experience	  of	  an	  object	  partly	  occluded	  by	  a	  fence,	  or	  your	  experience	  of	  
a	  triangle	  vs	  your	  experience	  of	  a	  Kanisza	  triangle.	  	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  way	  the	  
whole	  object	  is	  presented	  to	  you,	  and	  the	  way	  that	  its	  visible	  parts	  between	  the	  bars	  of	  the	  
fence	  are	  presented	  to	  you.	  	  Does	  your	  experience	  give	  you	  more	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  





subjects	  ended	  up	  claiming	  that	  they	  were	  imagining	  rather	  than	  seeing	  a	  red	  dot.44	  On	  the	  
basis	  of	  her	  result,	  one	  might	  claim	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  experiment	  has	  a	  visual	  perceptual	  
experience,	  although	  the	  experience	  lacks	  phenomenal	  force-­‐-­‐-­‐if	  they	  did	  have	  an	  experience	  
with	  phenomenal	  force,	  why	  would	  they	  say	  they	  are	  merely	  imagining?	  By	  itself,	  this	  verdict	  
does	  not	  directly	  challenge	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  force	  of	  experiences	  helps	  explain	  
how	  they	  provide	  justification,	  since	  the	  Perky	  subject	  may	  well	  lack	  justification	  from	  her	  
experience	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  red	  dot	  is	  in	  front	  of	  her.45	  	  But	  the	  Perky	  experiment	  does	  raise	  
the	  possibility	  that	  justificatory	  power	  and	  phenomenal	  force	  may	  come	  apart	  in	  some	  visual	  
experiences.46	  
	   According	  to	  a	  different	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Perky	  result,	  the	  Perky	  subject	  is	  having	  a	  
visual	  experience	  with	  phenomenal	  force,	  and	  simply	  is	  mistaken	  insofar	  as	  she	  thinks	  she	  does	  
not.	  	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  even	  if	  subjects	  mistakenly	  deny	  that	  they	  were	  seeing	  a	  red	  dot,	  
this	  does	  not	  undermine	  claims	  about	  the	  phenomenal	  differences	  between	  visualizing	  and	  
visual	  experience.	  	  Analogously,	  a	  subject	  might	  falsely	  believe	  she	  is	  in	  pain,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  
in	  any	  way	  undermine	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  phenomenal	  difference	  between	  pain	  and	  non-­‐
pain.	  	  	  
	  
	  
5.	  Accuracy	  conditions	  and	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  
	   In	  the	  previous	  section,	  we	  discussed	  the	  idea	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  take	  a	  stand	  
on	  how	  things	  are	  in	  the	  space	  around	  the	  perceiver.	  This	  conception	  of	  experiences	  can	  be	  
made	  more	  precise	  by	  the	  thesis	  that	  experiences	  have	  accuracy	  conditions.	  Beliefs	  have	  
contents,	  and	  the	  contents	  of	  beliefs	  are	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  belief	  (i.e.	  the	  state	  of	  
believing)	  is	  true.	  According	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  experience	  assumed	  here,	  experiences	  are	  the	  
kinds	  of	  states	  that	  can	  be	  accurate,	  and	  the	  contents	  of	  experience	  are	  conditions	  under	  which	  
experiences	  have	  this	  status.47	  
                                                
44	  For	  attempts	  to	  replicate	  this	  result,	  see	  Segal	  1972.	  For	  discussion	  see	  Nigel	  2010	  .	  	  	  
45	  For	  instance,	  perhaps	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  subject	  reasonably	  believes	  that	  she	  is	  imagining	  a	  red	  
dot,	  and	  not	  seeing	  one,	  defeats	  any	  justification	  that	  such	  experiences	  could	  otherwise	  provide	  
for	  a	  red-­‐dot	  proposition.	  
46	  For	  a	  potential	  case	  of	  phenomenal	  force	  without	  visual	  experience,	  consider	  sufferers	  of	  
Antons’s	  syndrome,	  who	  are	  blind	  but	  deny	  that	  they	  are	  blind.	  Perhaps	  they	  have	  visual	  
imagery	  which	  is	  subjectively	  indistinguishable	  from	  normal	  visual	  experiences	  of	  seeing.	  
According	  to	  one	  line	  of	  thought,	  the	  status	  of	  their	  visual	  experiences	  as	  imagery	  precludes	  
those	  experiences	  from	  having	  any	  justificatory	  force,	  even	  though	  it	  does	  not	  preclude	  them	  
from	  having	  phenomenal	  force.	  	  For	  more	  discussion,	  see	  Stoljar	  (ms).	  
47	  This	  assumption	  is	  less	  contentious	  than	  it	  might	  sound.	  It	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  the	  
phenomenal	  character	  of	  experiences	  determines	  its	  representational	  features,	  or	  the	  
converse.	  It	  also	  leaves	  open	  questions	  of	  priority	  of	  phenomenal	  character	  and	  content:	  does	  
the	  phenomenal	  force	  explain	  why	  experiences	  have	  accuracy	  conditions,	  or	  does	  the	  
explanatory	  priority	  go	  around	  the	  other	  way?	  Or	  does	  neither	  factor	  explain	  the	  other?	  For	  





In	  this	  section	  and	  the	  next,	  we	  discuss	  potential	  rational	  roles	  for	  contents	  of	  
experiences.	  	  Although	  we	  do	  so	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach,	  our	  discussion	  
could	  be	  adapted	  to	  theories	  that	  focus	  simply	  on	  the	  contents	  of	  experiences,	  or	  on	  non-­‐
phenomenal	  features	  of	  experiences	  such	  as	  their	  reliability,	  without	  assigning	  any	  rational	  role	  
to	  phenomenology.	  Some	  such	  theories	  allow	  that	  unconscious	  perception	  provides	  as	  much	  
justification	  for	  external	  world	  beliefs	  as	  conscious	  perception.	  	  	  
	  	  	   How	  might	  having	  contents	  enable	  experiences	  to	  justify	  beliefs?	  This	  claim	  is	  
sometimes	  motivated	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  relation	  that	  premises	  of	  an	  argument	  stand	  
in	  to	  a	  conclusion	  provides	  a	  model	  for	  justification	  in	  general.	  Pryor	  (2005)	  calls	  this	  idea	  the	  
“Premise	  Principle”:	  
	  
Premise	  Principle:	  The	  only	  things	  that	  can	  justify	  a	  belief	  that	  P	  are	  other	  states	  that	  
assertively	  represent	  propositions,	  and	  those	  propositions	  have	  to	  be	  ones	  that	  could	  be	  
used	  as	  premises	  in	  an	  argument	  for	  P.	  They	  have	  to	  stand	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  inferential	  
relation	  to	  P:	  they	  have	  to	  imply	  it	  or	  inductively	  support	  it	  (2005:	  189).48	  
	  
The	  Premise	  Principle	  faces	  a	  number	  of	  challenges.	  First,	  the	  principle	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  idea	  
that	  when	  one's	  state	  S1	  gives	  one	  justification	  to	  be	  in	  state	  S2,	  one	  can	  give	  a	  justifying	  
argument	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  content	  of	  S2	  by	  affirming	  the	  content	  of	  S1.	  	  But	  consider	  a	  case	  
where	  an	  experience	  of	  something	  red	  justifies	  believing	  that	  something	  is	  red.	  	  Here	  one	  
cannot	  give	  a	  justifying	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  something	  is	  red	  by	  affirming	  that	  
something	  is	  red.	  	  The	  motivation	  for	  the	  Premise	  Principle	  suggests	  that	  to	  justify	  my	  belief	  
that	  something	  is	  red,	  my	  experience	  would	  instead	  need	  to	  have	  the	  self-­‐representational	  
content	  that	  I	  see	  something	  is	  red,	  or	  some	  other	  content	  which	  could	  be	  marshaled	  in	  a	  
defense	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  something	  is	  red.49	  However,	  a	  visual	  experience	  with	  the	  content	  
that	  something	  is	  red	  is	  presumably	  a	  good	  candidate	  to	  justify	  believing	  that	  something	  is	  red,	  
whether	  or	  not	  it	  has	  such	  further	  contents.	  
	  	  	   A	  different	  pair	  of	  challenges	  relates	  to	  introspection.	  First,	  suppose	  that	  pains	  do	  not	  
have	  contents.50	  Even	  if	  one	  grants	  this	  assumption,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  headaches	  could	  still	  
justify	  self-­‐ascriptions	  of	  headaches.	  Second,	  even	  if	  (contrary	  to	  the	  assumption),	  pains	  do	  
have	  contents,	  these	  contents	  typically	  provide	  no	  obvious	  inferential	  support	  for	  the	  contents	  
of	  self-­‐ascriptions,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  enough	  support	  for	  our	  self-­‐ascriptions	  of	  pain	  to	  be	  as	  
                                                                                                                                                       
Kriegel	  (forthcoming).	  Finally,	  this	  conception	  of	  experience	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
theories	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  experience	  (see	  Siegel	  2010a),	  though	  for	  potentially	  opposing	  
perspectives,	  see	  Travis	  2004	  or	  Brewer	  2006,	  2011.	  
48	  See	  also	  Brewer	  (1999,	  ch.	  5)	  and	  Kornblith	  1980.	  
	  
49	  For	  a	  variety	  of	  self-­‐representational	  views	  of	  contents	  of	  experience,	  see	  Searle	  1983,	  
Chalmers	  2004,	  Siegel	  2006,	  Kriegel	  2009.	  	  
50	  For	  a	  defense	  of	  this	  idea,	  see	  McGinn	  1982,	  Searle	  1992,	  Langsam	  1995.	  For	  challenges	  to	  it,	  





justified	  as	  they	  are.51	  This	  point	  applies	  equally	  to	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  bodily	  sensations	  and	  
perceptual	  experiences.	  For	  instance,	  the	  proposition	  that	  a	  red	  roller	  skate	  is	  front	  of	  you	  does	  
not	  entail	  that	  you	  are	  seeing	  a	  red	  roller	  skate,	  and	  intuitively,	  there	  need	  be	  no	  inductive	  
generalization	  linking	  the	  presence	  of	  red	  roller	  skates	  in	  your	  vicinity	  to	  your	  seeing	  red	  roller	  
skates	  (perhaps	  you’ve	  never	  before	  seen	  a	  red	  roller	  skate).	  
	   These	  challenges	  could	  be	  avoided	  by	  limiting	  the	  Premise	  Principle	  to	  perceptual	  
experience	  (as	  opposed	  to	  bodily	  sensations,	  to	  avoid	  controversy	  about	  the	  status	  of	  pains	  as	  
contentful),	  and	  to	  external	  world	  	  beliefs	  (as	  opposed	  to	  self-­‐ascriptions).	  According	  to	  the	  
limited	  thesis	  that	  results,	  perceptual	  experiences	  justify	  external	  world	  	  beliefs,	  only	  if	  the	  
perceptual	  experiences	  have	  accuracy	  conditions.	  The	  limited	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  no	  unified	  
account	  of	  justification	  by	  experiences	  is	  available,	  and	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  any	  beliefs	  by	  
bodily	  sensations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  justification	  of	  self-­‐ascriptions	  of	  any	  sort	  of	  experiences,	  is	  
explained	  by	  different	  features	  than	  those	  that	  explain	  the	  justification	  of	  external	  world	  	  
beliefs	  by	  perceptual	  experiences.	  It	  is	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  the	  joints	  of	  epistemology	  fall	  
in	  the	  way	  the	  doubly	  limited	  thesis	  suggests,	  with	  both	  non-­‐perceptual	  experiences	  and	  self-­‐
ascriptions	  needing	  special	  treatment.52	  	  
Even	  if,	  contrary	  to	  the	  original	  Premise	  Principle,	  having	  content	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  
experiences	  to	  justify	  belief,	  the	  specific	  contents	  an	  experience	  has	  may	  help	  explain	  which	  
propositions	  they	  provide	  justification	  for	  believing.	  	  We	  turn	  to	  this	  idea	  next.	  
	  
6.	  Contents	  and	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  
It	  is	  plausible	  that	  when	  experiences	  justify	  beliefs,	  there	  is	  a	  non-­‐arbitrary	  relationship	  
between	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  experience	  and	  the	  contents	  of	  beliefs	  they	  justify.	  For	  instance,	  
by	  looking	  in	  the	  fridge,	  you	  get	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  contains	  mustard,	  but	  not	  
justification	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  sunset	  is	  streaked	  with	  orange.	  The	  objections	  to	  the	  Premise	  
Principle	  suggest	  that	  this	  non-­‐arbitrary	  relationship	  cannot	  be	  shoehorned	  into	  the	  structure	  
of	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  premise	  and	  a	  conclusion	  in	  a	  dialectically	  effective	  argument.	  
Given	  the	  assumption	  that	  experiences	  have	  contents	  and	  provide	  justification	  for	  
beliefs,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  the	  specific	  content	  of	  an	  experience	  helps	  explain	  which	  
propositions	  it	  can	  justify	  believing.	  According	  to	  a	  simple	  version	  of	  this	  idea,	  experiences	  can	  
justify	  beliefs	  whose	  contents	  are	  among	  the	  contents	  of	  experience.	  This	  idea	  presupposes	  
that	  beliefs	  can	  have	  exactly	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  contents	  as	  experience.	  Different	  forms	  of	  this	  
presupposition	  are	  defended	  by	  McDowell	  (1994),	  Brewer	  (1999)	  and	  Stalnaker	  (2003)	  (but	  
Brewer	  2006,	  2011	  and	  McDowell	  2009	  revise	  their	  earlier	  views).	  The	  presupposition	  has	  come	  
under	  attack	  from	  philosophers	  who	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  believe	  exactly	  what	  you	  
experience,	  because	  experiences	  form	  part	  of	  a	  system	  of	  perceptual	  representation	  that	  is	  so	  
                                                
51	  At	  least,	  the	  contents	  provide	  no	  obvious	  support,	  on	  the	  assumption	  (contra	  Searle	  1983,	  
Chalmers	  2004,	  Kriegel	  2009)	  that	  the	  contents	  do	  not	  include	  self-­‐representational	  contents	  
such	  as	  “I	  am	  having	  an	  experience	  as	  of	  something	  red”	  or	  “I	  am	  in	  pain”.	  	  	  
52	  Goldman	  2008	  assumes	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  such	  hiving	  off,	  treating	  unified	  accounts	  as	  
an	  explanatory	  virtue.	  In	  contrast,	  Boyle	  2009,	  following	  Moran	  2001,	  argues	  in	  favor	  of	  hiving	  





different	  from	  belief	  that	  the	  states	  of	  each	  system	  have	  fundamentally	  different	  contents.	  
Often	  the	  specifically	  perceptual	  contents	  are	  called	  ‘nonconceptual’,	  here	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	  are	  cannot	  be	  believed.53	  However,	  even	  proponents	  of	  nonconceptual	  content	  can	  agree	  
that	  some	  belief-­‐contents	  are	  closer	  to	  some	  exclusively	  perceptual	  contents	  than	  others.54	  In	  
some	  cases,	  the	  notion	  of	  closeness	  might	  be	  cashed	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  similarity	  between	  
properties.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  an	  experience	  represents	  a	  determinate	  color	  such	  as	  red39	  
and	  attributes	  it	  to	  an	  apple.	  Now	  compare	  a	  belief	  that	  attributes	  a	  more	  determinable	  
property	  (such	  as	  darkish	  red)	  to	  the	  apple,	  with	  a	  belief	  that	  attributes	  a	  completely	  different	  
color	  property	  (such	  as	  green)	  or	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  property	  altogether	  (such	  as	  being	  an	  
elephant).	  	  The	  content	  of	  the	  experience	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  belief	  attributing	  
darkish	  red,	  than	  it	  is	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  belief	  attributing	  the	  property	  of	  being	  an	  elephant.	  
In	  general,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  an	  experience	  presenting	  a	  red	  square	  on	  the	  left	  provides	  
justification	  for	  believing	  a	  proposition	  closely	  related	  to	  these	  contents.	  Feldman	  (2003)	  
endorses	  this	  idea,	  claiming	  that	  “when	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  belief	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  direct	  
contents	  of	  experience,	  they	  are	  more	  apt	  to	  be	  properly	  based	  on	  experience”	  (75).	  	  
The	  contents	  of	  experience	  might	  plausibly	  be	  thought	  to	  delimit	  the	  contents	  for	  which	  
experiences	  provide	  immediate	  justification.	  According	  to	  a	  proposal	  along	  these	  lines,	  an	  
experience	  can	  provide	  immediate	  justification	  for	  believing	  P,	  only	  if	  P	  is	  a	  content	  of	  the	  
experience,	  or	  is	  suitably	  close	  to	  such	  a	  content.	  	  Call	  this	  the	  Content	  Constraint	  on	  immediate	  
justification.	  The	  closer	  the	  content	  of	  experience	  is	  to	  a	  proposition	  P,	  the	  less	  the	  experience	  
might	  seem	  to	  need	  to	  be	  supplemented	  to	  provide	  justification	  for	  P.	  For	  instance,	  if	  the	  
contents	  of	  experiences	  were	  limited	  to	  color,	  shape	  and	  illumination	  properties,	  it	  might	  seem	  
that	  it	  could	  justify	  believing	  that	  mustard	  is	  in	  the	  fridge,	  only	  when	  supplemented	  with	  
justification	  for	  believing	  that	  the	  layout	  of	  colored	  shapes	  you	  see	  is	  a	  mustard	  jar.	  
According	  to	  a	  more	  specific	  version	  of	  the	  Content	  Constraint,	  an	  experience	  can	  
provide	  immediate	  justification	  for	  believing	  P,	  only	  if	  P	  is	  a	  phenomenal	  content	  of	  the	  
experience.	  A	  phenomenal	  content	  of	  an	  experience	  E	  is	  a	  content	  that	  supervenes	  on	  its	  
phenomenology,	  so	  that	  it	  will	  be	  shared	  with	  any	  experience	  that	  has	  the	  same	  phenomenal	  
character	  as	  E.55	  The	  Phenomenal	  Content	  Constraint	  is	  a	  strong	  thesis	  which	  combines	  the	  idea	  
that	  both	  phenomenal	  character	  and	  content	  bestow	  justificatory	  force	  on	  experiences.	  
To	  see	  the	  Phenomenal	  Content	  Constraint	  in	  action,	  consider	  a	  pair	  of	  experiences	  that	  
you	  have	  before	  and	  after	  you	  become	  spectrally	  inverted.	  After	  the	  inversion,	  with	  respect	  to	  
hue,	  red	  things	  look	  the	  way	  green	  things	  looked	  before	  the	  inversion,	  and	  green	  things	  look	  
the	  way	  red	  things	  looked	  before	  the	  inversion.	  Now	  consider	  two	  strawberries,	  a	  red	  ripe	  one	  
and	  a	  green	  unripe	  one,	  that	  are	  identical	  in	  all	  visible	  respects	  except	  color.	  With	  respect	  to	  
color,	  your	  experience	  of	  seeing	  the	  red	  ripe	  strawberry	  before	  the	  inversion	  is	  phenomenally	  
                                                
53	  Peacocke	  (1995),	  but	  see	  Stalnaker	  2003.	  For	  useful	  discussion	  of	  various	  notions	  of	  
“nonconceptual	  content”,	  see	  Speaks	  (2005),	  Byrne	  (2005),	  and	  Chuard	  (2009).	  
54	  Compare	  Peacocke’s	  notion	  of	  “canonical	  correspondence”	  between	  nonconceptual	  and	  
conceptual	  contents	  in	  his	  2004.	  
55	  For	  defense	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  experiences	  have	  phenomenal	  contents,	  see	  Siewert	  1998,	  Byrne	  





the	  same	  as	  your	  experience	  of	  seeing	  the	  unripe	  green	  strawberry	  after	  the	  inversion.	  Drawing	  
on	  externalist	  theories	  of	  content-­‐determination,	  some	  philosophers	  have	  argued	  that	  your	  
experiences	  in	  these	  cases	  could	  both	  be	  veridical	  with	  respect	  to	  color.56	  On	  this	  line	  of	  
thought,	  color	  content	  is	  not	  phenomenal	  content,	  since	  experiences	  that	  are	  phenomenally	  
the	  same	  can	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  colors	  they	  represent.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Phenomenal	  
Content	  Constraint,	  your	  color	  beliefs	  will	  not	  be	  immediately	  justified	  by	  experiences	  in	  such	  a	  
case,	  since	  they	  will	  not	  have	  contents	  sufficiently	  close	  to	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  experience.	  
Silins	  (2011)	  raises	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  Content	  Constraints,	  arguing	  that	  in	  a	  range	  of	  
common	  cases,	  including	  color	  experiences	  and	  experiences	  in	  which	  you	  see	  more	  items	  than	  
you	  have	  time	  to	  count,	  experiences	  may	  provide	  immediate	  justification	  for	  believing	  
propositions	  that	  are	  not	  included	  among	  their	  contents,	  and	  are	  not	  even	  entailed	  by	  those	  
contents.	  And	  perhaps	  perceptual	  experiences	  can	  immediately	  justify	  self-­‐ascriptions	  of	  those	  
experiences,	  even	  though	  they	  differ	  in	  contents,	  roughly	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  sentences	  	  “there	  
is	  a	  red	  cube	  in	  front	  of	  me”	  and	  “I	  see	  a	  red	  cube	  in	  front	  of	  me”	  differ	  in	  their	  contents.	  	  Much	  
will	  depend	  here	  on	  how	  the	  qualifications	  of	  “suitably	  close”	  contents	  are	  cashed	  out.	  	  	  
Even	  if	  the	  Content	  Constraints	  on	  immediate	  justification	  fail,	  there	  may	  still	  be	  a	  non-­‐
arbitrary	  relationship	  between	  the	  contents	  of	  experience	  and	  the	  propositions	  a	  subject’s	  
experience	  provides	  justification	  for	  believing.	  And	  if	  the	  range	  of	  propositions	  an	  experience	  
justifies	  depends	  on	  which	  contents	  it	  has,	  then	  it	  becomes	  important	  to	  settle	  which	  contents	  
can	  be	  contents	  of	  experience.	  Are	  the	  (phenomenal)	  contents	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  
limited	  to	  ‘low-­‐level’	  properties	  such	  as	  color,	  shape,	  texture	  illumination,	  motion,	  or	  can	  they	  
represent	  more	  complex	  properties	  such	  as	  being	  a	  lemon,	  being	  familiar,	  or	  being	  a	  cause	  of	  
an	  event?	  	  
This	  question	  might	  be	  pursued	  in	  several	  ways.57	  First,	  one	  might	  try	  to	  read	  off	  the	  
contents	  of	  experience	  from	  substantive	  theories	  about	  what	  determines	  which	  contents	  
experiences	  (or	  perhaps	  mental	  states	  in	  general)	  have,	  such	  as	  a	  causal	  co-­‐variation	  theory	  of	  
content.	  Second,	  one	  might	  try	  to	  devise	  principles	  linking	  the	  contents	  of	  perceptual	  reports	  to	  
the	  contents	  of	  experiences	  reported.58	  Third,	  one	  might	  defend	  hypotheses	  about	  contents	  on	  
the	  grounds	  that	  they	  best	  explain	  contrasts	  between	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  select	  pairs	  of	  
experiences,	  perhaps	  finding	  contrasting	  experiences	  in	  disorders	  such	  as	  agnosia	  or	  Capgras	  
syndrome,	  or	  in	  experimental	  effects	  such	  as	  perceptual	  adaption.59	  Finally,	  one	  might	  try	  to	  
gain	  traction	  on	  which	  contents	  are	  contents	  of	  experiences	  via	  epistemological	  considerations.	  
For	  instance,	  the	  Content	  Constraint	  could	  be	  reversed,	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Reverse	  Content	  Constraint:	  If	  an	  experience	  E	  immediately	  justifies	  believing	  P,	  then	  P	  
is	  a	  content	  of	  E.	  
	  
                                                
56	  Block	  (1990),	  Shoemaker	  (1994),	  or	  Chalmers	  (2004).	  
57	  Macpherson	  and	  Hawley	  (2009)	  and	  Brogaard	  (forthcoming(a))	  contain	  papers	  on	  this	  
debate.	  See	  also	  Prinz	  2006,	  Bayne	  2009,	  Siegel	  2010,	  Nanay	  2011.Masrour	  2011.	  
58	  Brogaard	  (forthcoming(b))	  





If	  there	  are	  independent	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  experiences	  can	  immediately	  justify	  believing	  
contents	  as	  complex	  as	  “Fiona	  is	  carrying	  a	  dog”	  or	  “My	  kite	  is	  teetering	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  a	  cliff”,	  
then	  according	  to	  the	  Reverse	  Content	  Constraint,	  these	  contents	  are	  contents	  of	  experience.60	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
7.	  Attention	  and	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  
Earlier	  we	  considered	  a	  blindsighted	  subject	  who	  unconsciously	  registers	  the	  presence	  
of	  a	  red	  ball	  would	  have	  less	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  a	  red	  ball	  is	  present,	  compared	  with	  
a	  sighted	  subject	  who	  saw	  the	  red	  ball	  (and	  had	  an	  experience	  in	  which	  it	  looked	  red	  and	  
spherical).	  The	  Blindsight	  intuition	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  whether	  attending	  to	  the	  red	  ball	  is	  
necessary	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  have	  justification	  from	  her	  experience.	  For	  all	  the	  blindsight	  
scenario	  has	  specified	  so	  far,	  the	  sighted	  subject	  may	  be	  attending	  to	  the	  ball.	  Likewise,	  
standard	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  are	  also	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  attending	  to	  
what	  she	  sees	  –	  as	  when	  you	  look	  in	  the	  fridge	  and	  find	  the	  mustard	  you	  were	  searching	  for,	  or	  
when	  Moore,	  while	  giving	  his	  Proof	  of	  the	  external	  world	  attends	  to	  his	  hands	  (“I	  hold	  up	  a	  
hand	  and	  gesture…”).61	  If	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  is	  correct,	  is	  it	  only	  attentive	  experiences	  
that	  provide	  justification,	  or	  do	  inattentive	  experiences	  provide	  justification	  as	  well?	  
This	  question	  will	  not	  arise	  if,	  necessarily,	  all	  experiences	  are	  attentive,	  since	  
consciousness	  requires	  attention.62	  But	  if	  there	  are	  inattentive	  experiences	  –	  phenomenal	  
states	  in	  which	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  of	  representing	  a	  red	  ball	  but	  does	  not	  attend	  to	  it	  –	  then	  
the	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  faces	  a	  basic	  question	  about	  its	  scope:	  is	  it	  phenomenal	  character	  
per	  se	  that	  provides	  justification,	  or	  is	  it	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  the	  sort	  one	  has	  when	  
attending	  to	  what	  one	  sees?63	  
We	  can	  distinguish	  between	  two	  answers	  to	  this	  question.	  According	  to	  the	  Attention	  
Needed	  view,	  only	  attentive	  experiences	  provide	  propositional	  justification.	  According	  to	  the	  
Attention	  Optional	  view,	  inattentive	  experiences	  can	  provide	  propositional	  justification.	  The	  
restriction	  to	  propositional	  justification	  is	  important.	  Both	  positions	  could	  allow	  that	  attention	  
is	  needed	  (or	  that	  it	  is	  typically	  needed)	  for	  forming	  doxastically	  justified	  beliefs.	  The	  issue	  is	  
whether	  attention	  is	  needed	  upstream	  of	  belief	  formation,	  for	  experiences	  to	  provide	  
propositional	  justification.	  
Prima	  facie,	  both	  positions	  seem	  defensible.	  It	  seems	  plain	  that	  attention	  is	  not	  
epistemically	  idle.	  Typically,	  if	  you	  look	  closely	  in	  the	  fridge,	  you’ll	  be	  in	  a	  better	  epistemic	  
position	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  there’s	  mustard	  inside,	  compared	  to	  your	  epistemic	  position	  if	  
you	  look	  quickly	  or	  carelessly.	  Perhaps	  at	  the	  limit,	  if	  attention	  runs	  out	  but	  consciousness	  
                                                
60	  A	  version	  of	  the	  Reverse	  Content	  Constraint	  could	  also	  be	  formulated	  for	  phenomenal	  
contents:	  If	  an	  experience	  E	  immediately	  justifies	  believing	  P,	  then	  P	  is	  a	  phenomenal	  content	  
of	  E.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Silins	  (2011,	  forthcoming-­‐b).	  	  	  
61	  Moore	  1939.	  
62	  For	  the	  view	  that	  all	  experiences	  are	  attentive,	  see	  Mack	  and	  Rock	  1998	  or	  Prinz	  2010.	  	  For	  its	  
denial,	  see	  Searle	  1992	  or	  Mole	  2011.	  
63	  For	  existing	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  attention	  in	  epistemology,	  see	  Mole	  2008,	  2011,	  and	  





persists,	  there’s	  no	  justification	  provided	  by	  the	  experience.	  If	  so,	  this	  conclusion	  would	  favor	  
the	  Attention	  Needed	  view.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  evidence	  can	  survive	  un-­‐noticed,	  and	  this	  may	  seem	  to	  favor	  the	  
Attention	  Optional	  view.	  Attentive	  experiences	  tend	  to	  correlate	  with	  experiences	  that	  are	  
accessible	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  cognitive	  system	  (for	  instance,	  by	  feeding	  into	  belief	  and	  action).	  
Suppose	  you	  know	  that	  you	  have	  an	  appointment	  with	  x	  alone	  at	  noon,	  that	  you	  have	  an	  
appointment	  with	  y	  alone	  at	  noon,	  and	  that	  x	  ≠	  y.	  	  You	  could	  have	  propositional	  justification	  to	  
believe	  that	  you	  have	  conflicting	  appointments,	  even	  if	  you	  haven’t	  noticed	  the	  conflict.	  Once	  
you	  notice	  it,	  you’ll	  have	  based	  your	  belief	  on	  the	  previously	  un-­‐noticed	  evidence.	  So	  long	  as	  
the	  evidence	  is	  un-­‐noticed,	  it	  is	  in	  that	  sense	  inaccessible.	  If	  beliefs	  can	  provide	  un-­‐noticed	  
evidence,	  then	  there	  seems	  no	  obvious	  reason	  to	  deny	  that	  experiences	  could	  do	  the	  same.	  If	  
they	  can,	  this	  conclusion	  would	  favor	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  view.	  
We	  can	  illustrate	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  two	  views	  by	  considering	  some	  classic	  
experiments.	  In	  a	  typical	  inattentional	  ‘blindness’	  experiment	  (Most	  2001,	  2005),	  subjects	  are	  
asked	  to	  perform	  the	  attentionally	  demanding	  task	  of	  counting	  how	  many	  white	  boxes	  bounce	  
of	  the	  side	  of	  a	  display.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  subjects	  do	  not	  report	  seeing	  a	  red	  cross	  that	  passes	  
slowly	  (over	  5	  seconds)	  through	  the	  fixation	  point.	  Assuming	  that	  these	  subjects	  experience	  the	  
red	  cross	  (as	  a	  red	  cross)	  without	  attending	  it,	  their	  inattentive	  experience	  does	  not	  influence	  
what	  they	  report.	  According	  to	  the	  Attention	  Needed	  view,	  the	  inattentive	  experience	  of	  the	  
red	  cross	  cannot	  provide	  propositional	  justification	  for	  a	  red-­‐cross	  belief.	  According	  to	  the	  
Attention	  Optional	  view,	  it	  can.	  	  
Which	  position,	  Attention	  Needed	  and	  Attention	  Optional,	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  truth?	  This	  
question	  matters	  for	  debates	  about	  “internalism”	  and	  “externalism”	  in	  epistemology.	  	  
According	  to	  internalism	  about	  justification,	  whether	  a	  subject	  is	  justified	  in	  believing	  a	  
proposition	  depend	  exclusively	  on	  factors	  internal	  to	  the	  subject’s	  mind.	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  
that,	  if	  one	  privileges	  the	  role	  of	  consciousness	  in	  epistemology,	  one	  will	  be	  as	  “internalist”	  as	  
one	  could	  be.	  But	  which	  factors	  internal	  to	  the	  mind	  matter?	  Does	  everything	  given	  in	  
consciousness	  deserve	  the	  privilege,	  or	  only	  what	  the	  subject	  is	  given	  in	  attention,	  and	  thereby	  
made	  cognitively	  accessible?	  If	  consciousness	  outside	  attention	  is	  rationally	  idle,	  as	  it	  is	  on	  the	  
Attention	  Needed	  view,	  that	  suggests	  that	  perceptual	  justification	  depends	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  
cognitive	  accessibility	  bestowed	  by	  attention.	  The	  Attention	  Needed	  view	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
accessibilist	  form	  of	  internalism	  that	  filters	  out	  inattentive	  experiences	  from	  the	  grounds	  for	  
justification,	  leaving	  in	  only	  attentive	  experiences.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
8.	  States	  of	  seeing	  	  
Which	  features	  of	  experiences	  explain	  how	  they	  provide	  justification?	  In	  discussing	  this	  
question,	  we’ve	  divided	  constitutive	  features	  of	  experience	  from	  causal	  features.	  On	  which	  side	  
of	  this	  distinction	  does	  the	  status	  of	  an	  experience	  as	  a	  state	  of	  seeing	  belong?	  The	  answer	  
depends	  on	  whether	  the	  relationship	  between	  visual	  experiences	  and	  the	  things	  you	  see	  is	  
causal	  or	  constitutive.	  For	  simplicity,	  we	  assume	  that	  if	  this	  relation	  is	  causal,	  it	  is	  also	  non-­‐
constitutive	  and	  contingent.	  
If	  the	  relation	  is	  causal	  and	  non-­‐constitutive,	  then	  you	  could	  have	  the	  same	  experience	  





experience	  is	  a	  state	  of	  seeing	  as	  opposed	  to	  hallucination	  depends	  on	  its	  etiology.	  	  
Hallucinations	  have	  endogenous	  causes,	  whereas	  states	  of	  seeing	  are	  caused	  in	  part	  by	  the	  
things	  seen	  (scenes,	  objects,	  events,	  etc).	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  if	  the	  relation	  between	  visual	  experiences	  and	  states	  of	  seeing	  is	  
constitutive,	  then	  which	  experiences	  you	  have	  (or	  equivalently,	  which	  phenomenal	  state	  you	  
are	  in)	  depends	  on	  whether	  you	  are	  seeing	  or	  not.	  Whether	  you	  are	  seeing	  or	  hallucinating	  is	  
thus	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  etiology.64	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  thesis	  that	  states	  of	  seeing	  help	  explain	  
how	  experiences	  provide	  justification	  falls	  under	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach.65	  	  
In	  discussing	  whether	  the	  things	  seen	  are	  causally	  or	  constitutively	  related	  to	  
experiences,	  we	  have	  ignored	  the	  differences	  between	  seeing	  objects,	  facts,	  events,	  and	  other	  
things.	  It	  is	  an	  open	  question	  which	  locutions	  involving	  “see”	  denote	  different	  mental	  states	  
(contrast	  “see	  the	  ball”,	  “see	  the	  ball	  roll	  away”,	  “see	  the	  ball	  rolling	  away”,	  “see	  that	  the	  ball	  is	  
rolling	  away”,	  etc.)	  	  Let	  us	  focus	  on	  states	  of	  seeing	  ordinary	  objects	  such	  as	  basketballs,	  and	  
ignore	  the	  differences	  between	  seeing	  the	  basketball	  bouncing,	  which	  is	  arguably	  a	  relation	  to	  a	  
state	  of	  affairs,	  and	  seeing	  that	  the	  basketball	  is	  bouncing,	  which	  is	  arguably	  a	  relation	  to	  a	  
proposition.	  The	  locution	  seeing	  that	  p	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  be	  factive	  (you	  can	  see	  that	  p	  only	  if	  p	  
is	  true),	  and	  we’ll	  assume	  that	  it	  denotes	  a	  factive	  state.66	  	  
Let	  us	  begin	  with	  both	  factive	  and	  non-­‐factive	  states	  of	  seeing.	  We	  will	  focus	  on	  how	  
much	  justification	  such	  states	  provide	  for	  beliefs,	  leaving	  open	  the	  corresponding	  issues	  about	  
knowledge,	  or	  still	  other	  epistemic	  states	  (perhaps	  states	  of	  seeing	  do	  have	  an	  epistemically	  
privileged	  role	  to	  play,	  just	  not	  with	  respect	  to	  justification).	  	  Non-­‐factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  can	  be	  
present	  in	  cases	  of	  illusion,	  for	  example	  when	  the	  things	  you	  see	  look	  to	  have	  properties	  they	  in	  
fact	  lack,	  but	  not	  hallucination.	  Does	  the	  status	  of	  an	  experience	  as	  a	  state	  of	  seeing	  of	  either	  
sort	  contribute	  to	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  the	  experience?	  A	  main	  motivation	  for	  thinking	  it	  
does	  concerns	  de	  re	  beliefs	  about	  what	  you	  see.	  The	  perceptual	  beliefs	  we	  form	  about	  the	  
objects	  we	  see	  are	  typically	  beliefs	  whose	  truth	  or	  falsity,	  relative	  to	  a	  world	  w,	  depends	  on	  
how	  things	  are	  with	  that	  object	  in	  world	  w.67	  Intuitively,	  seeing	  an	  object	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  
form	  a	  de	  re	  belief	  about	  it	  (as	  well	  as	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  form	  other	  de	  re	  mental	  states	  
about	  it,	  such	  as	  desires	  and	  hopes).	  Some	  philosophers	  invoke	  this	  role	  to	  argue	  either	  that	  
phenomenal	  states	  themselves	  have	  singular	  contents,	  or	  are	  sometimes	  partly	  constituted	  by	  
                                                
64	  Individual	  experiential	  episodes	  may	  be	  constitutively	  linked	  to	  states	  of	  seeing.	  But	  our	  
discussion	  should	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  at	  the	  level	  of	  types.	  
65	  See	  Campbell	  (2002),	  chapter	  6.	  
66	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  also	  assumed	  to	  entail	  that	  the	  subject	  knows	  that	  P	  (Dretske	  1969,	  2006,	  
Williamson	  2000),	  and	  other	  times	  merely	  that	  the	  subject	  believes	  that	  P.	  We	  will	  not	  assume	  
that	  either	  of	  these	  additional	  entailments	  hold.	  	  	  	  
67	  The	  need	  to	  specify	  truth	  relative	  to	  a	  world	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  experiences	  provide	  
justification	  for	  beliefs	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  using	  sentences	  containing	  demonstratives	  such	  






relations	  of	  seeing	  and	  the	  objects	  seen.68	  But	  independently	  of	  whether	  being	  a	  state	  of	  
object-­‐seeing	  is	  a	  causal	  or	  constitutive	  feature	  of	  experiences,	  we	  can	  ask	  whether	  there	  are	  
asymmetries	  between	  the	  rational	  roles	  of	  states	  of	  seeing,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
hallucinations,	  or	  hallucinations	  and	  illusions,	  on	  the	  other.	  
A	  first	  kind	  of	  asymmetry	  concerns	  the	  propositions	  for	  which	  states	  of	  seeing	  provide	  
justification.	  Are	  there	  propositions	  that	  are	  justified	  by	  states	  of	  seeing,	  but	  not	  by	  
hallucinations?	  Candidates	  include	  the	  propositions	  that	  figure	  in	  de	  re	  beliefs	  about	  the	  things	  
you	  see.	  Since	  in	  (pure)	  hallucinations,	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  you	  see,	  the	  hallucination	  does	  not	  
put	  you	  in	  a	  position	  to	  form	  such	  de	  re	  beliefs,	  let	  alone	  provide	  justification	  for	  them.69	  
A	  second	  kind	  of	  asymmetry	  concerns	  the	  degree	  of	  justification	  provided	  by	  factive	  
states	  of	  seeing,	  as	  opposed	  to	  all	  other	  experiences	  (both	  hallucinations	  and	  non-­‐factive	  states	  
of	  seeing).	  Normally,	  if	  you	  see	  a	  pig	  in	  a	  pigpen,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  way	  it	  looks,	  your	  factive	  state	  of	  
seeing	  settles	  the	  question	  for	  you	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  pig	  in	  the	  pigpen.	  And	  aside	  from	  
justifying	  the	  de	  re	  belief	  (that	  is	  a	  pig	  in	  a	  pigpen),	  your	  state	  of	  seeing	  the	  pig	  also	  justifies	  a	  
belief	  with	  existentially	  quantified	  contents	  (there	  is	  a	  pig	  in	  the	  pigpen).	  Unlike	  the	  de	  re	  belief	  
with	  singular	  contents,	  the	  belief	  with	  general	  content	  can	  be	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
experience	  in	  cases	  of	  hallucination.	  With	  respect	  to	  propositions	  that	  are	  available	  to	  be	  
believed	  in	  cases	  of	  factive	  seeing,	  non-­‐factive	  seeing,	  and	  hallucination,	  do	  factive	  states	  of	  
seeing	  provide	  more	  justification	  than	  hallucinations?	  If	  so,	  then	  these	  states	  of	  seeing	  have	  a	  
privileged	  status	  as	  providers	  of	  justification,	  compared	  with	  hallucinations.	  Similarly,	  if	  factive	  
states	  of	  seeing	  provide	  more	  justification	  than	  non-­‐factive	  experiential	  states,	  then	  factive	  
states	  of	  seeing	  have	  a	  privileged	  status	  as	  providers	  of	  justification.	  
Both	  McDowell	  (1996,	  2008)	  and	  Williamson	  (2000)	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  defending	  
asymmetries	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  justification	  provided	  by	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
hallucinations	  and	  non-­‐factive	  states	  of	  seeing.70	  The	  idea	  that	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing,	  or	  a	  
limited	  subclass	  of	  them,	  enjoy	  a	  privileged	  epistemic	  status	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  
states	  are	  constitutively	  connected	  to	  the	  facts	  that	  make	  true	  the	  very	  beliefs	  that	  those	  
perceptual	  states	  justify.	  The	  factive	  state	  of	  seeing	  is	  constitutively	  infallible	  with	  respect	  to	  
the	  proposition	  that	  Wilbur	  (the	  pig	  you	  see)	  is	  a	  pig	  in	  the	  pigpen.	  You	  won’t	  count	  as	  seeing	  
that	  that	  is	  a	  pig	  in	  a	  pigpen,	  unless	  that	  is	  a	  pig	  in	  a	  pigpen.	  	  
Constitutive	  infallibility	  involves	  modal	  features	  that	  may	  attach	  equally	  to	  states	  with	  
necessarily	  true	  contents,	  yet	  which	  intuitively	  do	  not	  provide	  justification	  for	  believing	  those	  
contents.	  For	  instance,	  if	  you	  guess	  that	  p	  (for	  some	  necessarily	  true	  proposition	  p),	  then	  you	  
                                                
68	  On	  this	  motivation	  for	  taking	  relations	  of	  seeing	  to	  be	  partly	  constitutive	  of	  experiences,	  see	  
Campbell	  2002,	  Tye	  2009,	  Schellenberg	  2009.	  
69	  We	  set	  aside	  putative	  hallucinations	  with	  de	  re	  contents,	  such	  as	  hallucinations	  of	  your	  
father.	  Arguably	  even	  these	  do	  not	  put	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  position	  to	  initiate	  the	  kind	  of	  
connection	  to	  an	  object	  that	  makes	  a	  mental	  state	  de	  re	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  object,	  though	  
once	  such	  a	  connection	  is	  established,	  a	  de	  re	  hallucination	  may	  put	  one	  in	  a	  position	  to	  form	  
new	  de	  re	  mental	  states	  about	  it.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Johnston	  2004.	  





cannot	  make	  that	  guess	  without	  p	  being	  true.71	  	  An	  analogous	  point	  holds	  for	  forgetting	  or	  
overlooking	  necessary	  truths.	  	  But	  a	  proponent	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  provide	  
more	  justification	  than	  non-­‐factive	  experiential	  states	  (including	  non-­‐factive	  states	  of	  seeing)	  
might	  invoke	  additional	  features	  besides	  constitutive	  infallibility	  to	  ground	  the	  epistemic	  
privilege	  of	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing,	  such	  as	  the	  phenomenal	  force	  found	  in	  states	  of	  seeing,	  and	  
not	  found	  in	  guesses,	  or	  cases	  of	  forgetting	  or	  overlooking	  necessary	  truths.	  
According	  to	  a	  different	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  enjoy	  privileged	  
epistemic	  status	  with	  respect	  to	  justification,	  someone	  in	  a	  factive	  state	  of	  seeing	  has	  two	  
sources	  of	  justification	  for	  believing	  the	  general	  proposition	  (there	  is	  a	  pig	  in	  the	  pigpen),	  
whereas	  the	  subject	  who	  hallucinates	  a	  pig	  in	  the	  pigpen	  has	  only	  one	  source	  of	  justification.	  
For	  the	  factively	  seeing	  subject,	  on	  this	  theory,	  the	  general	  proposition	  is	  both	  a	  content	  of	  
their	  experience,	  and	  is	  known	  to	  be	  entailed	  by	  the	  singular	  content	  of	  their	  state	  of	  seeing.	  
The	  hallucinator	  shares	  the	  first	  source	  of	  justification,	  by	  having	  the	  general	  proposition	  
among	  the	  contents	  of	  their	  experience.	  But	  they	  do	  not	  share	  the	  second	  source	  of	  
justification,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  not	  in	  any	  psychological	  state	  with	  singular	  content	  that	  entails	  
the	  general	  proposition.	  
	   An	  opponent	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  enjoy	  privileged	  epistemic	  status	  
with	  respect	  to	  justification	  might	  focus	  on	  the	  rational	  responses	  to	  seamless	  transitions	  
between	  such	  states	  and	  hallucinations.72	  (This	  point	  of	  focus	  is	  also	  found	  in	  the	  “new	  evil	  
demon”	  problem	  to	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.)	  If	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  provide	  some	  
additional	  boost	  of	  justification,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  irrational	  to	  maintain	  confidence	  at	  the	  same	  
level	  through	  seamless	  transition	  from	  seeing	  to	  hallucination,	  when	  one	  starts	  out	  with	  the	  
highest	  degree	  of	  confidence	  justified	  by	  the	  state	  of	  seeing.	  Contraposing,	  if	  it	  would	  be	  
rational	  to	  maintain	  the	  same	  confidence	  level	  across	  such	  transitions,	  then	  this	  undermines	  
the	  idea	  that	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  enjoy	  privileged	  epistemic	  status	  with	  respect	  to	  
justification.	  	  
	  	   We	  have	  examined	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  are	  
epistemically	  privileged	  with	  respect	  to	  justification,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  such	  states	  are	  
identified	  with	  phenomenal	  states	  (experiences	  in	  our	  official	  sense).	  The	  epistemic	  advantages	  
of	  factive	  states	  of	  seeing	  could	  arguably	  be	  enjoyed	  whether	  or	  not	  any	  phenomenal	  state	  is	  
identical	  with	  a	  factive	  state	  of	  seeing.	  The	  epistemological	  upshots	  of	  metaphysical	  
disjunctivism	  are	  highly	  controversial.73	  	  	  
	  
Part	  II.	  Causal	  features	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  How	  might	  the	  etiology	  of	  an	  experience	  affect	  its	  ability	  to	  provide	  justification?	  A	  first	  
idea,	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  is	  that	  an	  experience	  might	  be	  caused	  by	  an	  object	  or	  
                                                
71	  An	  important	  difference	  between	  factive	  seeing	  and	  factive	  guessing	  is	  that	  the	  constitutive	  
infallibility	  stems	  from	  the	  content	  of	  the	  guess,	  but	  from	  the	  state	  in	  the	  case	  of	  factive	  seeing.	  
72	  For	  discussion	  of	  seamless	  transition	  cases,	  see	  Johnston	  2004	  and	  Neta	  2008.	  For	  further	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  factive	  states	  are	  privileged	  with	  respect	  to	  justification,	  see	  
Wedgwood	  2002,	  Silins	  2005,	  and	  Schiffer	  2009.	  





scene	  that	  you	  see,	  and	  its	  status	  as	  a	  state	  of	  seeing	  helps	  explain	  some	  of	  its	  justificatory	  
powers.	  A	  second	  idea,	  examined	  in	  section	  9,	  is	  that	  experiences	  confer	  justification,	  when	  
they	  do,	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  parts	  of	  processes	  that	  reliably	  give	  rise	  to	  true	  beliefs.	  A	  third	  idea,	  
examined	  in	  section	  10,	  is	  that	  causal	  influences	  on	  experiences	  from	  subject’s	  prior	  mental	  
states	  can	  affect	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  the	  experience.	  	  
	  
9.	  Reliability	  
We	  begin	  with	  a	  simple	  version	  of	  reliabilism,	  according	  to	  which	  your	  experience	  of	  
type	  E	  gives	  you	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  P,	  just	  in	  case	  E	  is	  reliably	  correlated	  with	  its	  being	  
the	  case	  that	  P.	  	  This	  simple	  version	  of	  reliabilism	  draws	  a	  straightforward	  connection	  between	  
justification	  and	  truth.	  	  Since	  this	  idea	  is	  so	  powerful	  and	  reliabilism	  in	  its	  many	  forms	  is	  so	  
influential,	  we	  won’t	  say	  much	  else	  by	  way	  of	  motivation.74	  	  
Reliabilism	  is	  compatible	  with	  Immediacy,	  as	  we	  mentioned	  in	  section	  2.	  In	  general,	  
Immediacy	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  as	  phenomenal	  types,	  experiences	  do	  not	  suffice	  to	  
provide	  immediate	  justification,	  because	  further	  etiological	  constraints	  must	  be	  met.	  For	  
instance,	  Goldman	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  experiences	  can	  and	  do	  provide	  immediate	  justification,	  
but	  only	  if	  they	  are	  part	  of	  process	  that	  generates	  reliably	  true	  beliefs.75 
Reliabilism	  is	  versatile	  enough	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  Phenomenal	  Approach	  (which	  
denies	  that	  the	  blindsighter’s	  perceptions	  provide	  justification),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opposing	  
position.	  Since	  the	  perceptual	  states	  of	  the	  blindsighter	  are	  as	  reliable	  as	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  
sighted	  subject,	  simple	  reliabilists	  will	  say	  that	  the	  blind-­‐sighted	  subject	  has	  just	  as	  much	  
justification	  from	  his	  perceptual	  states	  as	  the	  sighted	  subject	  gains	  from	  his	  experience.	  	  The	  
phenomenology	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  sighted	  subject	  will	  not	  contribute	  to	  justification.	  But	  in	  
principle,	  a	  more	  refined	  version	  of	  reliabilism	  could	  be	  combined	  with	  the	  Phenomenal	  
Approach,	  resulting	  in	  the	  position	  that	  experience	  provides	  justification	  for	  believing	  certain	  
                                                
74	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  status	  of	  reliabilism	  and	  related	  views	  as	  a	  response	  to	  skepticism,	  see	  
Bonjour	  (1985),	  Bergmann	  (2000),	  and	  Fumerton	  (1995,	  2006).	  
75	  Reliabilism	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  entail	  Immediacy,	  but	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  its	  denial.	  For	  
instance,	  in	  principle,	  a	  perceptual	  process	  (call	  it	  A)	  by	  which	  one	  forms	  reliably	  true	  beliefs	  
that	  P	  might	  encompass	  a	  process	  by	  which	  one	  forms	  reliably	  true	  beliefs	  that	  Q.	  If	  so,	  then	  on	  
the	  face	  of	  it,	  to	  be	  justified	  by	  perception	  in	  believing	  p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  A,	  one	  might	  have	  to	  
rely	  on	  being	  justified	  in	  believing	  Q.	  If	  process	  A	  were	  the	  only	  perceptual	  route	  by	  which	  one	  
could	  reliably	  form	  true	  beliefs	  that	  Q,	  then	  by	  virtue	  of	  resulting	  from	  process	  A,	  beliefs	  in	  Q	  
would	  be	  justified,	  but	  such	  beliefs	  could	  only	  ever	  be	  justified	  mediately.	  	  To	  illustrate,	  
consider	  a	  demonstrative	  belief,	  about	  an	  object	  o	  that	  you	  see,	  that	  it	  is	  a	  car.	  Suppose	  that	  
this	  belief	  results	  from	  a	  process	  that	  generates	  reliably	  true	  beliefs,	  roughly	  the	  process	  by	  
which	  you	  successfully	  recognize	  cars	  as	  cars.	  And	  suppose	  that	  this	  recognitional	  process	  
encompasses	  a	  process	  by	  which	  you	  form	  reliably	  true	  beliefs	  about	  what	  cars	  looks	  like,	  
beliefs	  whose	  contents	  are	  approximated	  by	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  sentence-­‐schema	  ‘Cars	  looks	  
like	  ___’,	  where	  the	  blank	  is	  filled	  in	  with	  a	  term	  denoting	  a	  type	  of	  phenomenal	  state.	  A	  
reliabilist	  might	  hold	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  believing	  of	  o	  that	  it	  is	  a	  car	  is	  both	  mediate,	  and	  





contents,	  in	  virtue	  of	  both	  its	  phenomenal	  character	  and	  the	  type	  of	  process	  to	  which	  it	  
belongs,	  because	  the	  appropriate	  process	  has	  to	  be	  individuated	  in	  part	  by	  a	  phenomenal	  state.	  
Simple	  reliabilism	  has	  been	  attacked	  from	  a	  number	  of	  directions.	  First,	  as	  a	  sufficient	  
condition	  for	  perceptual	  justification,	  reliable	  correlation	  is	  often	  held	  to	  be	  insufficiently	  
demanding,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  an	  agent	  might	  be	  endowed	  with	  a	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  
clairvoyance,	  while	  still	  failing	  to	  gain	  justification	  from	  it,	  if	  the	  subject	  has	  no	  inkling	  that	  she	  
has	  such	  a	  faculty,	  or	  if	  she	  has	  what	  are	  intuitively	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	  her	  perception	  is	  
unreliable.76	  A	  related	  objection	  is	  exactly	  analogous	  to	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection	  discussed	  
in	  section	  3.	  According	  to	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection,	  if	  reliabilism	  is	  true,	  then	  one’s	  
experiences	  can	  end	  up	  themselves	  giving	  one	  a	  justified	  belief	  that	  they	  are	  reliable.	  In	  
response,	  the	  same	  options	  listed	  in	  section	  3	  are	  available	  here	  as	  well.	  	  
Second,	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  perceptual	  justification,	  reliable	  correlation	  is	  often	  
held	  to	  be	  too	  demanding.	  	  Suppose	  an	  evil	  demon	  makes	  someone’s	  experiences	  misleading	  
most	  of	  the	  time.	  When	  it	  visually	  seems	  to	  the	  person	  that	  P,	  it	  tends	  to	  not	  be	  the	  case	  that	  
P.	  	  Suppose	  further	  that	  these	  misleading	  experiences	  could	  not	  easily	  have	  been	  accurate,	  so	  
that	  they	  are	  robustly	  unreliable.	  	  According	  to	  the	  classic	  objection,	  contrary	  to	  what	  
reliabilism	  about	  perceptual	  justification	  predicts,	  the	  victim’s	  experiences	  still	  give	  her	  
justification	  for	  ordinary	  beliefs.77	  	  	  
Simple	  reliabilism	  might	  be	  refined	  as	  a	  causal	  theory,	  as	  in	  process	  reliabilism,	  
according	  to	  which	  an	  experience	  justifies	  a	  proposition	  P	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  results	  from	  a	  process	  
that	  reliably	  produces	  true	  beliefs	  that	  P.78	  When	  one	  forms	  a	  perceptual	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
a	  given	  process,	  that	  process	  falls	  under	  many	  process	  types,	  and	  these	  types	  of	  process	  may	  
differ	  in	  how	  reliable	  they	  are.	  	  
A	  reliabilist	  theory	  will	  make	  different	  predictions	  about	  which	  beliefs	  are	  justified,	  
depending	  on	  which	  process	  type	  figures	  in	  the	  theory.	  	  A	  third	  objection	  to	  reliabilism,	  known	  
as	  the	  Generality	  Problem,	  specifically	  targets	  process	  reliabilism.	  	  A	  given	  process	  that	  
generates	  a	  belief	  presumably	  can	  fall	  under	  many	  types,	  such	  as	  being	  a	  process	  generated	  by	  
veridical	  perception,	  being	  a	  process	  which	  occurs	  on	  Tuesday,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  
specify	  which	  process	  type	  is	  relevant.79	  Responses	  to	  the	  Generality	  Problem	  that	  specify	  the	  
relevant	  type	  of	  process	  may	  address	  the	  earlier	  objections	  as	  well.	  
                                                
76	  Bonjour	  1980.	  For	  discussion	  of	  responses,	  see	  Prichard	  2005.	  
77	  Lehrer	  and	  Cohen	  1983,	  Cohen	  1984.	  For	  responses,	  see	  Goldman	  1986,	  Greco	  2005,	  and	  
Littlejohn	  2009.	  	  
78	  Goldman	  1979,	  2008.	  For	  further	  refinements	  of	  reliabilist	  approaches,	  see	  Sosa	  1991,	  2007,	  
2009,	  Plantinga	  1993,	  1996,	  Comesaña	  2002,	  2010,	  Burge	  2003,	  Peacocke	  2004,	  Sawyer	  and	  
Majors	  2005,	  Bergmann	  2006,	  Lyons	  2009,	  or	  Graham	  2011.	  	  The	  Burge/Peacocke/Sawyer	  
approach	  privileges	  the	  role	  of	  one’s	  relations	  to	  the	  environment	  in	  individuating	  the	  contents	  
of	  one’s	  perceptual	  states,	  for	  evaluation,	  see	  Martin	  2001	  and	  Silins	  forthcoming.	  
79	  The	  Generality	  Problem	  was	  first	  formulated	  and	  labeled	  as	  such	  by	  Feldman	  1985,	  though	  
something	  like	  it	  is	  anticipated	  by	  Goldman	  1979.	  A	  related	  challenge	  is	  to	  specify	  the	  relevant	  
type	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  a	  reliability	  requirement	  is	  not	  too	  easily	  satisfied	  by	  every	  true	  





In	  contrast	  to	  the	  controversy	  over	  reliabilism	  about	  justification,	  the	  reliability	  of	  
processes	  by	  which	  beliefs	  are	  formed	  has	  been	  less	  controversial	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  
perceptual	  knowledge.	  	  Reliability	  has	  been	  advanced	  as	  a	  condition	  that	  rules	  out	  the	  sort	  of	  
“epistemic	  luck”	  present	  in	  classic	  Gettier	  cases,	  in	  which	  one	  has	  a	  justified	  true	  belief	  without	  
yet	  having	  knowledge.	  For	  a	  potential	  example	  of	  such	  a	  case,	  suppose	  that,	  at	  noon,	  you	  
happen	  to	  check	  the	  time	  on	  a	  clock	  with	  a	  dial	  frozen	  at	  noon.80	  Several	  different	  anti-­‐luck	  
conditions	  have	  been	  proposed	  to	  explain	  why	  knowledge	  is	  absent	  from	  such	  cases,	  appealing	  
to	  different	  kinds	  of	  co-­‐variation	  between	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  the	  facts	  one	  putatively	  knows.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  First,	  according	  to	  “sensitivity”	  requirements	  for	  knowledge	  (to	  a	  first	  approximation),	  
one’s	  knowing	  that	  P	  requires	  that	  if	  it	  weren’t	  the	  case	  that	  P,	  one	  would	  not	  believe	  that	  P.81	  
For	  instance,	  suppose	  that	  someone	  is	  looking	  at	  a	  wolf	  which	  looks	  like	  a	  dog,	  where	  the	  
person	  forms	  a	  perceptual	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her.	  	  Suppose	  further	  that	  there	  
is	  indeed	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her-­‐-­‐-­‐namely	  a	  chihauhau	  which	  the	  wolf	  happens	  to	  have	  just	  gulped	  
down.	  	  If	  the	  person	  doesn’t	  know	  of	  the	  wolf’s	  recent	  dog-­‐consumption,	  she	  presumably	  does	  
not	  know	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her.	  	  According	  to	  the	  proponent	  of	  a	  sensitivity	  
requirement	  for	  knowledge,	  the	  best	  diagnosis	  for	  the	  person’s	  failure	  to	  know	  is	  that	  she	  
would	  still	  have	  believed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her,	  even	  if	  there	  hadn’t	  been	  a	  dog	  in	  
front	  of	  her,	  because	  the	  wolf	  hadn’t	  recently	  swallowed	  one.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Providing	  an	  adequate	  formulation	  of	  a	  sensitivity	  requirement	  for	  perceptual	  
knowledge	  is	  challenging.	  	  Suppose	  that	  someone	  is	  looking	  at	  a	  chihauhau	  in	  good	  conditions,	  
and	  let	  us	  stipulate	  that	  if	  there	  hadn’t	  been	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  a	  dog-­‐
resembling	  wolf	  in	  front	  of	  her	  instead.	  	  Here	  she	  still	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  a	  perfectly	  good	  position	  
to	  know	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her,	  given	  that	  she	  is	  looking	  at	  a	  chihauhau	  in	  good	  
conditions.	  	  However,	  if	  there	  hadn’t	  been	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her,	  she	  would	  still	  have	  believed	  
that	  there’s	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  her,	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  dog-­‐looking	  wolf.82	  Or	  consider	  the	  
everyday	  sort	  of	  change	  blindness	  discussed	  by	  Dretske	  2004.	  If	  your	  friend	  shaved	  off	  his	  
moustache,	  you	  would	  fail	  to	  notice,	  and	  so	  would	  retain	  your	  belief	  that	  he	  has	  a	  moustache.	  	  
Still,	  such	  facts	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  damage	  your	  ability	  to	  know	  that	  he	  has	  a	  moustache	  when	  he	  is	  
right	  in	  front	  of	  you.83	  	  To	  avoid	  the	  counterexamples,	  one	  might	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  method	  
used	  by	  the	  person	  to	  form	  her	  belief.	  	  But	  this	  raises	  the	  question,	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  
Generality	  Problem	  for	  reliabilism	  about	  justification,	  about	  how	  to	  individuate	  the	  method.	  	  
For	  example,	  one	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  perceptual	  states	  essential	  to	  the	  method	  are	  states	  
                                                                                                                                                       
reliable	  process,	  but	  presumably	  not	  all	  beliefs	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  veridical	  hallucinations	  
are	  justified.	  For	  responses	  to	  the	  generality	  problem,	  see	  Beebe	  2004	  and	  Comesaña	  2006.	  	  
For	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  problem	  generalizes	  beyond	  reliabilism,	  see	  Bishop	  2010.	  	  	  
80	  A	  case	  described	  by	  Russell	  1948.	  
81	  Nozick	  1981,	  with	  important	  precedents	  in	  Dretske	  1971	  and	  Goldman	  1979.	  
82	  For	  similar	  cases	  see	  Goldman	  1979	  and	  Hawthorne	  2005.	  





of	  seeing,	  or	  phenomenal	  states	  that	  a	  subject	  can	  be	  in,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  
seeing.84	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Setting	  aside	  exactly	  how	  to	  articulate	  a	  sensitivity	  requirement	  for	  perceptual	  
knowledge,	  many	  reject	  the	  sensitivity	  approach	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  too	  demanding.	  	  
Consider	  any	  belief	  you	  have	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  you	  do	  not	  falsely	  believe	  that	  P.	  	  If	  you	  were	  to	  
falsely	  believe	  that	  P,	  you	  presumably	  would	  still	  believe	  that	  you	  didn’t	  falsely	  believe	  that	  P.	  	  
Knowledge	  that	  you	  don’t	  falsely	  believe	  that	  p	  thus	  seems	  out	  of	  reach	  on	  the	  sensitivity	  
approach,	  and	  a	  restriction	  of	  the	  approach	  just	  to	  perceptual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  environment	  is	  
presumably	  ad	  hoc.85	  	  Indeed,	  if	  skepticism	  is	  to	  be	  avoided	  by	  the	  proponent	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  
approach,	  they	  will	  have	  to	  allow	  that	  you	  might	  have	  perceptual	  knowledge	  that	  P,	  as	  well	  as	  
logical	  knowledge	  that:	  P	  only	  if	  you	  don’t	  falsely	  believe	  that	  P,	  yet	  still	  be	  unable	  to	  know	  that	  
you	  don’t	  falsely	  believe	  that	  P.	  	  On	  pain	  of	  accepting	  skepticism,	  the	  sensitivity	  approach	  
would	  seem	  to	  have	  to	  violate	  a	  “closure”	  principle	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  knowledge	  is	  “closed”	  
under	  known	  entailment.86	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  According	  to	  reliabilist	  critics	  of	  sensitivity	  conditions	  on	  knowledge,	  we	  should	  prefer	  a	  
different	  reliability	  requirement	  for	  perceptual	  knowledge	  called	  “safety”.	  	  Here	  the	  key	  idea	  is	  
that	  if	  one	  has	  perceptual	  knowledge	  that	  p,	  then	  one	  could	  not	  easily	  have	  been	  mistaken	  
about	  whether	  P.87	  Proponents	  of	  the	  safety	  requirement	  say	  that	  it	  avoids	  the	  over-­‐demanding	  
character	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  requirement	  for	  perceptual	  knowledge,	  while	  providing	  a	  good	  
diagnosis	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  knowledge	  in	  classic	  Gettier	  cases.	  If	  the	  dog-­‐looking	  wolf	  could	  
easily	  have	  failed	  to	  come	  by	  the	  chihauhau	  to	  eat,	  one	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  mistaken	  in	  
believing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dog	  in	  front	  of	  one.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Whether	  the	  safety	  requirement	  indeed	  avoids	  the	  challenges	  facing	  the	  sensitivity	  
requirement	  is	  unclear.	  First,	  consider	  the	  quantum	  mechanical	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  matter	  in	  
my	  car	  disperses	  so	  as	  to	  leave	  behind	  a	  mere	  car	  façade.88	  As	  improbable	  as	  the	  hypothesis	  is,	  
                                                
84	  If	  states	  of	  seeing	  are	  privileged,	  sensitivity	  accounts	  cease	  to	  predict	  that	  you	  don’t	  know	  
you’re	  not	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat,	  given	  that	  you	  would	  not	  able	  to	  use	  the	  method	  of	  relying	  upon	  
states	  of	  seeing	  if	  you	  were	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat.	  	  But	  proponents	  of	  the	  approach	  such	  as	  Nozick	  
1981	  actually	  seek	  the	  result	  that	  you	  don’t	  know	  you’re	  not	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat.	  For	  further	  
overview	  of	  the	  challenges	  in	  specifying	  a	  sensitivity	  account,	  see	  DeRose	  1995,	  2010,	  or	  
Williamson	  2000.	  
85	  Vogel	  2000.	  
86	  Nozick	  1981	  and	  Dretske	  2005	  embrace	  the	  conclusion	  and	  reject	  closure.	  Vogel	  (1990)	  and	  
Hawthorne	  (2005)	  defends	  the	  closure	  principle.	  Roush	  2006	  argues	  that	  the	  sensitivity	  
approach	  can	  avoid	  rejecting	  closure.	  For	  more	  recent	  worries	  about	  closure	  principles,	  see	  
Laasonen-­‐Aarnio	  (2008)	  and	  Schechter	  (forthcoming).	  	  For	  discussion	  of	  whether	  any	  closure	  
principle	  is	  both	  strong	  enough	  and	  plausible	  enough	  to	  sustain	  a	  skeptical	  argument,	  David	  and	  
Warfield	  (2004),	  Lawlor	  (2005),	  or	  Blome-­‐Tillman	  (2006).	  	  
87	  Sosa	  1999	  and	  2007,	  Sainsbury	  1997,	  Williamson	  2000,	  Pritchard	  2005,	  also	  Manley	  (2007).	  	  
For	  criticisms,	  see	  Brueckner	  and	  Fiocco	  (2002),	  Neta	  and	  Rohrbaugh	  (2004)	  or	  Comesaña	  
(2005).	  





it	  still	  arguably	  could	  “easily”	  have	  been	  true,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  true	  in	  some	  worlds	  only	  
slightly	  different	  from	  the	  actual	  world.	  	  In	  such	  worlds,	  however,	  I	  make	  a	  mistake	  about	  
whether	  my	  car	  is	  outside,	  and	  thus	  fail	  to	  have	  perceptual	  knowledge	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  at	  
least	  on	  one	  understanding	  of	  the	  safety	  proposal.89	  Second,	  some	  philosophers	  have	  argued	  
that	  a	  safety	  requirement	  for	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  combined	  with	  acceptance	  of	  a	  suitable	  
closure	  principle	  for	  knowledge,	  without	  accepting	  skepticism.90	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Many	  internalists	  about	  justification	  appeal	  to	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  experiences	  of	  an	  
unwitting	  brain	  in	  the	  vat	  or	  victim	  of	  an	  evil	  demon	  would	  not	  be	  robbed	  of	  their	  justificatory	  
power,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  not	  feed	  into	  a	  process	  that	  reliably	  generates	  true	  
beliefs.91	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  the	  suboptimal	  etiology	  of	  such	  experiences	  is	  not	  enough	  by	  
itself	  to	  reduce	  (let	  alone	  to	  eliminate)	  their	  justificatory	  power.	  Some	  reliabilists	  acknowledge	  
the	  force	  of	  this	  intuition,	  while	  nonetheless	  maintaining	  that	  etiological	  facts	  about	  
experiences	  can	  affect	  whether	  they	  provide	  justification,	  even	  if	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  
those	  etiological	  features.92	  We	  now	  consider	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  unknown	  etiology	  of	  
experiences	  might	  affect	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  experiences.	  
	  
10.	  Cognitive	  penetration	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  a	  subject’s	  background	  beliefs	  affect	  how	  she	  responds	  to	  what	  
she	  sees,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	  her	  to	  respond.	  Consider	  an	  expert	  birdwatcher	  who	  
identifies	  a	  bird	  she	  sees	  as	  a	  flycatcher,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  background	  belief	  (developed	  in	  the	  
course	  of	  learning	  to	  discriminate	  different	  birds)	  about	  how	  flycatchers	  look.	  In	  contrast,	  if	  
someone	  unaccustomed	  to	  observing	  birds	  saw	  the	  same	  bird	  from	  exactly	  the	  same	  position,	  
she	  would	  normally	  not	  form	  any	  belief	  about	  what	  specific	  kind	  of	  bird	  it	  is,	  because	  she	  
cannot	  discriminate	  kinds	  of	  birds	  from	  one	  another.	  If	  she	  did	  form	  the	  belief	  that	  it’s	  a	  
flycatcher,	  that	  would	  be	  a	  lucky	  guess,	  unjustified	  by	  any	  expertise	  or	  reasoning	  (Feldman	  
2003).	  
It	  is	  one	  thing	  for	  expert	  and	  novice	  to	  form	  different	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  they	  
both	  see.	  It	  is	  another	  for	  the	  expert	  and	  novice	  to	  have	  phenomenally	  different	  experiences	  as	  
the	  result	  of	  their	  difference	  in	  what	  else	  they	  know	  or	  believe.	  In	  principle,	  a	  phenomenal	  
                                                
89	  One	  might	  maintain	  that,	  as	  the	  safety	  approach	  is	  best	  understood,	  one	  need	  only	  avoid	  
false	  belief	  that	  p	  in	  most	  of	  the	  worlds	  sufficiently	  similar	  to	  the	  actual	  world	  (see	  Pritchard	  
2005).	  	  A	  potential	  difficulty	  for	  this	  response	  is	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  an	  original	  
motivation	  of	  the	  safety	  approach.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  motivate	  the	  safety	  approach	  by	  
saying	  that	  it	  explains	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  doesn’t	  know	  one’s	  lottery	  ticket	  will	  lose,	  since	  one	  
falsely	  believes	  that	  one’s	  ticket	  will	  lose	  in	  a	  world	  which	  is	  sufficiently	  similar	  to	  the	  actual	  
world.	  	  This	  explanation	  won’t	  work	  on	  the	  new	  understanding	  of	  the	  safety	  requirement-­‐-­‐-­‐one	  
does	  avoid	  false	  belief	  about	  whether	  one’s	  ticket	  will	  lose	  in	  most	  worlds	  sufficiently	  similar	  to	  
the	  actual	  world.	  	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  problem,	  see	  Greco	  (2007).	  	  
90	  The	  worry	  traces	  to	  Kripke’s	  unpublished	  lectures	  on	  Nozick’s	  theory	  of	  knowledge.	  For	  a	  
published	  discussion	  see	  e.g.	  Cohen	  2008.	  Vogel	  “Subjunctivitis”?	  
91	  Cohen	  1984,	  Wedgewood	  2002	  	  





difference	  could	  result	  from	  attention,	  as	  when	  the	  expert	  pays	  attention	  to	  different	  features	  
of	  the	  same	  bird	  than	  the	  novice,	  or	  it	  could	  arise	  perhaps	  even	  when	  expert	  and	  novice	  attend	  
to	  the	  exactly	  the	  same	  features.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  experiences	  could	  differ,	  
along	  with	  its	  phenomenal	  character,	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  expertise.	  
In	  this	  example,	  it	  is	  expertise	  that	  influences	  the	  experiences,	  but	  we	  could	  imagine	  
examples	  in	  which	  the	  influence	  comes	  from	  moods,	  desires,	  suspicions,	  fears,	  or	  other	  mental	  
states.93	  We	  can	  call	  influences	  on	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  by	  any	  of	  these	  
kinds	  of	  states	  ‘cognitive	  penetration.’94	  Some	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  penetration,	  such	  as	  those	  
that	  may	  be	  found	  in	  expertise,	  seem	  to	  belong	  to	  overall	  improvements	  in	  the	  subject’s	  
epistemological	  situation.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  that	  expertise	  in	  radiology	  changes	  what	  one	  
sees	  when	  looking	  at	  an	  x-­‐ray	  by	  perceptual	  reorganization,	  creating	  new	  perceptual	  cues	  that	  
are	  unavailable	  to	  the	  non-­‐expert.	  This	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  would	  help	  the	  radiologist	  
spot	  the	  tumors	  when	  looking	  for	  them	  on	  x-­‐rays.	  	  
Other	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  penetration	  seem	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  a	  traditional	  conception	  
of	  the	  rational	  roles	  played	  by	  experiences.	  In	  science,	  experiments	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  
confirming	  scientific	  theories,	  because	  they	  allow	  for	  controlled	  observation	  that	  allows	  
experimenters	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  against	  one	  another.	  In	  everyday	  contexts,	  we	  treat	  
perception	  as	  a	  means	  of	  finding	  out	  mundane	  facts,	  such	  as	  whether	  there	  is	  mustard	  in	  the	  
fridge,	  or	  whether	  the	  dog	  is	  inside.	  At	  the	  level	  of	  abstraction	  found	  in	  philosophy,	  experience	  
and	  reason	  are	  traditionally	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  two	  ultimate	  sources	  of	  rational	  support	  for	  
beliefs.95	  But	  if	  what	  you	  see	  is	  determined	  by	  what	  you	  already	  fear,	  suspect,	  or	  believe	  to	  be	  
the	  case,	  then	  these	  penetrating	  psychological	  states	  seem	  to	  stack	  the	  tribunal	  of	  experience	  
in	  their	  favor,	  preventing	  us	  from	  using	  experience	  to	  rationally	  assess	  our	  beliefs,	  fears	  or	  
suspicions.	  	  
How	  widespread	  is	  cognitive	  penetration?	  The	  idea	  that	  perception	  and	  scientific	  
observation	  can	  be	  free	  of	  such	  influences	  underlies	  the	  idea	  that	  perceptual	  systems	  are	  
modular,	  taking	  in	  information	  without	  systematic	  influence	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  cognitive	  
system.96	  A	  host	  of	  experimental	  results	  suggest	  that	  non-­‐perceptual	  states	  of	  all	  sorts	  can	  
                                                
93	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  said	  that	  in	  depression,	  things	  look	  grey.	  For	  discussion	  see	  
Barrick	  2002.	  
94	  This	  use	  of	  “cognitive	  penetration”	  is	  broader	  than	  the	  kind	  targeted	  by	  Pylyshyn	  in	  his	  
(1998).	  Pylyshyn	  argues	  that	  early	  vision	  is	  exclusively	  the	  output	  of	  a	  module	  and	  as	  such	  is	  not	  
the	  product	  of	  other	  cognitive	  states	  (though	  its	  outputs	  maybe	  influenced	  by	  perceptual	  
learning.	  See	  Goldstone’s	  entry,	  this	  volume).	  In	  contrast,	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  whether	  
visual	  experience	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  prior	  mental	  states.	  It	  can	  be,	  even	  if	  experience	  is	  partly	  
the	  output	  of	  a	  module.	  	  
95	  Chisholm	  1966.	  
96	  Fodor	  1983	  holds	  that	  modular	  processes	  form	  only	  one	  part	  of	  perception,	  leaving	  it	  as	  an	  
open	  question	  whether	  he	  thinks	  conscious	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  exclusively	  or	  even	  mainly	  
the	  output	  of	  modules.	  Some	  of	  Fodor’s	  examples	  of	  outputs	  of	  modules	  are	  conscious	  
experiences,	  such	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  seeing	  the	  Müller-­‐Lyer	  lines	  as	  different	  in	  length	  even	  





influence	  perception,	  and	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  many	  of	  these	  seem	  to	  threaten	  modularism	  about	  
perception.97	  All	  of	  these	  results	  are	  tendentious,	  and	  further	  interpretation	  and	  
experimentation	  is	  needed	  to	  discover	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  impact	  on	  perception	  that	  prior	  
mental	  states	  have.	  Prior	  mental	  states	  could	  influence	  solely	  actions	  or	  judgments	  
downstream	  of	  experience,	  leaving	  experience	  itself	  intact,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  would	  not	  take	  the	  
form	  of	  cognitive	  penetration.	  When	  prior	  states	  do	  impact	  experience,	  they	  could	  impact	  the	  
contents	  of	  experience,	  or	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  belief-­‐formation,	  or	  the	  pattern	  of	  
experiences	  one	  is	  likely	  to	  have.	  We	  can	  then	  ask	  to	  what	  extent,	  if	  any,	  these	  effects	  on	  
experience	  prevent	  us	  from	  using	  it	  to	  compare	  our	  prior	  beliefs,	  suspicions,	  or	  fears	  with	  
reality,	  to	  reach	  a	  reasonable	  verdict	  on	  whether	  they	  are	  true.	  
	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  some	  internalist	  theories	  of	  justification,	  such	  as	  those	  which	  
say	  that	  an	  experience	  with	  the	  content	  that	  P	  is	  sufficient	  to	  give	  one	  prima	  facie	  justification	  
to	  believe	  that	  P,	  cognitive	  penetration	  has	  no	  direct	  impact	  on	  justification.	  According	  to	  these	  
theories,	  cognitive	  penetration	  may	  lead	  to	  illusory	  (falsidical)	  experiences,	  but	  the	  rational	  role	  
of	  these	  experiences	  is	  not	  compromised	  any	  more	  than	  it	  is	  in	  standard	  visual	  illusions,	  such	  as	  
when	  one	  sees	  the	  Müller-­‐Lyer	  lines,	  or	  in	  scenarios	  that	  put	  experiences	  systematically	  in	  
error,	  such	  as	  thought-­‐experiments	  in	  which	  a	  demon	  or	  scientist	  manipulates	  the	  brain	  of	  the	  
subject.	  No	  etiological	  facts	  about	  experiences	  can	  affect	  their	  status	  as	  providers	  of	  prima-­‐
facie	  justification,	  according	  to	  some	  internalist	  theories.	  	  Setting	  internalism	  aside,	  some	  
reliabilist	  theories	  might	  also	  hold	  that	  cognitive	  penetration	  has	  little	  epistemological	  
significance,	  if	  what	  the	  theory	  privileges	  is	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception	  at	  a	  sufficiently	  general	  
level.	  	  	  
Other	  versions	  of	  internalism,	  however,	  can	  grant	  that	  cognitive	  penetration	  can	  
compromise	  the	  status	  of	  experiences	  as	  providers	  of	  prima-­‐facie	  justification,	  without	  allowing	  
that	  experiences	  in	  standard	  visual	  illusions	  or	  brain-­‐in-­‐a-­‐vat	  scenarios	  are	  compromised.	  For	  
instance,	  suppose	  someone’s	  unjustified	  suspicion	  that	  there	  is	  a	  gun	  in	  her	  fridge	  influences	  
the	  contents	  of	  her	  experience,	  so	  that	  when	  she	  opens	  the	  fridge	  to	  look	  inside,	  she	  has	  an	  
experience	  as	  of	  a	  gun.	  The	  process	  by	  which	  suspicion	  morphs	  imperceptibly	  into	  belief	  
without	  an	  intervening	  experience	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  irrational	  way	  of	  forming	  a	  belief.	  The	  
same	  holds	  for	  fear	  and	  hope	  morphing	  into	  belief:	  these	  are	  cases	  of	  fearful	  or	  wishful	  
thinking.	  The	  crucial	  epistemological	  question	  is	  then	  whether	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  experience	  
happens	  along	  the	  way	  makes	  this	  process	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  any	  less	  irrational.	  It	  is	  open	  to	  
internalists	  to	  hold	  that	  it	  is	  not	  any	  less	  irrational,	  and	  that	  whereas	  experiences	  caused	  a-­‐
rationally	  by	  a	  demon	  manipulating	  their	  brain	  provide	  prima-­‐facie	  justification,	  experiences	  
caused	  by	  irrational	  processes	  internal	  to	  the	  subject	  do	  not.98	  
                                                                                                                                                       
end	  of	  the	  process	  of	  belief-­‐fixation	  as	  he	  construes	  it	  that	  it	  is	  partly	  the	  output	  of	  central	  
processing.	  
97	  For	  a	  range	  of	  results	  claimed	  to	  challenge	  modularism,	  see	  Levin	  and	  Banaji	  2006,	  the	  papers	  
collected	  in	  Bar	  2011,	  also	  Proffitt	  and	  Linkenauger	  (forthcoming)	  and	  many	  of	  the	  papers	  cited	  
therein.	  
98	  This	  position	  is	  explored	  in	  Siegel	  (forthcoming).	  Epistemological	  issues	  arising	  from	  the	  





The	  idea	  that	  experiences	  can	  have	  irrational	  etiologies	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  traditional	  
idea	  that	  the	  epistemic	  goodness	  or	  badness	  of	  belief	  derives	  from	  the	  way	  it	  is	  grounded	  in	  
reason	  and	  experience.	  On	  the	  traditional	  picture,	  reason	  and	  experience	  are	  the	  two	  ultimate	  
arbiters	  of	  belief.	  Both	  are	  clearly	  sources	  of	  rational	  belief,	  yet	  neither	  source	  is	  itself	  grounded	  
in	  either	  reason	  or	  experience.	  	  As	  some	  foundationalists	  would	  put	  it,	  experiences	  justify	  
beliefs	  without	  themselves	  being	  justified,	  or	  otherwise	  susceptible	  to	  rational	  evaluation.	  	  On	  
the	  revised	  picture,	  experiences	  can	  themselves	  be	  grounded,	  well	  or	  badly,	  in	  prior	  reason	  and	  
experience,	  and	  this	  grounding	  affects	  the	  rational	  role	  they	  can	  play,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  role	  in	  
stopping	  regresses	  when	  we	  examine	  the	  antecedent	  sources	  of	  justification	  of	  a	  belief.	  	  	  
	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
Traditionally,	  discussions	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  have	  focused	  on	  whether	  the	  
transition	  from	  perception	  to	  belief	  can	  be	  rational.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  this	  entry,	  we	  begin	  from	  the	  
substantive	  assumption	  that	  the	  transition	  is	  sometimes	  rational,	  and	  explore	  a	  range	  of	  
potential	  features	  of	  experiences	  that	  make	  experiences	  suited	  to	  stand	  in	  such	  rational	  
relations,	  when	  they	  do.	  
When	  the	  topic	  has	  this	  shape,	  it	  can	  be	  approached	  by	  examining	  which	  transitions	  
between	  experience	  and	  belief	  yield	  rationally	  as	  opposed	  to	  irrationally	  formed	  beliefs.	  This	  
approach	  would	  foreground	  doxastic	  justification,	  in	  its	  focus	  on	  how	  beliefs	  are	  formed	  in	  
response	  to	  experiences.	  The	  topic	  can	  also	  be	  approached	  by	  foregrounding	  propositional	  
justification	  provided	  by	  experience,	  by	  attempting	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  the	  rational	  roles	  
of	  experience	  from	  metaphysical	  premises	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  experiences,	  such	  as	  their	  
underlying	  metaphysical	  structure,	  their	  contents,	  their	  phenomenal	  character,	  or	  their	  
etiology.	  Both	  approaches	  bring	  into	  focus	  the	  complex	  interrelationship	  between	  the	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